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ABSTRACT 
A general definition of interpreted formal language is presented. 
The notion ''is a part of" is formally developed and models of the 
resulting part theory are used as universes of discourse of the forrnal 
languages. It is shown that certain Boolean algebras are models of 
part theory. 
With this development, the structure imposed upon the universe 
of discourse by a forma l language is characterized by a group of 
automorphisms of the model of part theory. If the model of part 
theory is thought of as a static world, the automorphisms become the 
changes which take place in the world. Using this formalism, we 
discuss a notion of abstraction and the concept of definability. A 
Galois connection between the groups characterizing formal languages 
and a language-like closure over the groups is determined. 
It is shown that a set theory can be developed within models of 
p art theory such that certain strong formal languages can be said to 
determin e the ir own set theory. This development is such that for a 
given forma l l anguage whose universe of discourse is a model of pai:t 
theory, a set the ory can b e imb edde d as a submode! of part theory so 
that the formal l anguage has parts which are sets as its discursive 
entities, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The study of formal languages in the abstract has applications in 
mathema tical log ic, linguistics, and information science. In linguis-
tics formal languages are used to approximate natural languages [2, 
3, 4, 5 ]. 
In information science, formal l anguage theory has been used to 
describe computer programming languages , for exa1nple [33 ], 
design question answering systems [8 ], and h as potential applications 
in furthering the understanding of information system behavior. 
Possibly the greatest b enefit to be gained from abstract formal 
language th e ory is the under standing of the limitations of formal 
languages, Recursive function theory [18, 9, 22 J has made a major 
contribution to our understanding of these limitations , but we feel 
that much remains to be gained by considering both the syntax and 
semantics of formal languages abstractly. 
Fc::irmal syntax has been quite thoroughly explored, for example 
[11, 15, 19, 25 ]. Ginsberg [11 J has an extensive bibliography on 
formal syntax, Forma l l anguage semantics have b een define d [ 1 7, 
32, 33 ], but previously lit tle was k nown about the properties of 
forma l l anguages with both a syntactic and semantic co1nponent. This 
dissertation considers certa in properties of such formal languages . 
Following Thompson [ 32 ], we define a formal l anguage as a collec -
tion of semantic transforrnations on some universe of discourse. We 
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then show that each collection of semantic transformations gives rise 
to an associated syntax which is the syntax of the formal language. 
To provide a uniform and highly homogeneous universe of 
discourse for all formal lan_guages, we consider part theory in 
Chapter III. Part theory is based on an axiomitization of the notion 
"is a part of 11 , as in "the leg is a part of the table. 11 We can consider 
a formal language to give a particular structure to the universe of 
parts, and we characterize this structure by a group of automorph-
isms of the universe of parts. 
Our intuition indicates that for each pair of formal l anguages 
there is a language powerful enough to de s cribe anything which is 
d escribable in either of the original language s, and that there is a 
language in which the only describable entities are those describable 
in both orig inal languages . For exa mple, the computer programming 
languages Algol and Fortran are similar , containing so1ne similar 
syntactic constructions to d es cribe the same process. The algebraic 
expr essions of the two l anguages are in this category. A language 
consisting of just algebraic expressions is a lower bound l anguage to 
Algol and Fortran. As a more powe rful language in which we c an 
express anything expressible in either Algol or Fortran, we tak e the 
assembly l anguage of the c omputer. This is an upper bound language 
for Algol and Fortran. The problem of finding upper and lower bound 
languages for a p a ir of for mal l anguages is partially solved by 
considering the lattice of groups of automorphisms and the Galois 
connection between the groups associated w ith formal l anguages and 
the semantic transforma tion closure on t he groups. 
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The intuition also indicates that the universe of discourse of a 
formal language can always be considered to be a model of set 
theory. In Chapter V we show that it is possible to imbed a set 
theory within a sufficiently l arge model of part theory so that a given 
formal langua ge simultaneously has both parts and sets as discursive 
entities. The central result of this dissertation is that certain strong 
formal languages determine their own set theory. 
Finally, in Chapter VI we consider various research problems 
which the material in this dissertation has suggested. One of the 
more interesting of these is the possibility of defining formally our 
intuitive feeling about the distance between languages. For example, 
we feel that Algol and Fortran are much closer to each other than 
either is to Cobol. If we can realize this intention, our understand-
ing of languages will be greatly enhanced. 
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II. FORMAL LANGUAGES 
We present here material sufficient to define the general notion of 
a formal language as it will be treated in the sequel. A fuller treat-
ment, including motivational material, is in Thompson [32 ], to 
which this chapter owes its genesis. 
A language is often considered to have two components, syntactic 
and semantic, The syntax determines which sequences of words are 
well-formed or grammatical. The semantics establishes the n1ean -
ings of the grammatical sequences. For us, a formal language will 
refer to a formalized semantics, from. which a syntax can be derived. 
Universe of Discourse 
A formal language must talk about something, its universe of 
discourse. Since we are attempting to formalize notions of language, 
we will assume we have at our disposal a set theory, which we will 
use in the usual informal mathematical manner. In order to dis tin-
guish between this "outside 11 set theory and any particular model of 
set theory which may be the universe of discourse of a given formal 
l anguage, we will refer, throughout the dissertation, to "outside 11 
sets as classes and sets in any given model of set theory as sets. 
Since we will follow the Z ermelo - Fraenkel axiomitization of set 
.. 
theory, the class- set distinction of Bernays - Godel will not be 
ne ede d . 
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The universe of discourse of a formal lang uage is a model of a 
relational system, U = < U 
0
, R 1 , R 2 , ••• , Rn, ••• > where U 0 is an 
abstract class and the R. are finitary relations defined on U 
1 0 
Hence, the objects inte rrelated by a formal language are elements of 
u 
0 
In mathematical model theory there is usually some relationship 
between the formal lang uage and the relations, R. , of the model U , 
1 
but no such restriction is implied here. 
Suppose the universe of discourse is given as the relational 
system U = < U
0
, R 1 , R 2 , Furthermore, suppose we 
have a model of set theory M = < M , e > , where e is the relation 
0 
"is a membe.r of". Then we can always n1.odel the given relational 
system within M, and we may, if we so desire, consider any formal 
language to have a model of set theory as its univers e of discourse. 
Semantic Categor ies 
A semantic c ategory is to be thought of as a coll ection of objects 
having some property in common. For example, if the model U is a 
ring, the zero-divisors of U can be thought of as a semantic category. 
Since a formal language is to have a finite "computable" cha racter 
(as opposed to a natural l anguage , which may not be definable or 
computable), we will insist that a given formal language posse ss a 
finite number of semantic categories. Each semantic category may 
contain an infinite number of objects, and the semantic categor ies 
need not be disjoint. Furthermore, in the 11m etatheory" there may 
be an infinite number of categ ories, each corresponding to a 
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property of U = < U 
0
, R 1 , .•• , Rn' .•• > , but only a finite collection 
of these are in a given formal language over U • 
Let n be an integer, i.e., n E w. Then K = {C. /iE n} is a collec-
1 
tion of semantic categories if each C. is a subclass of U 
l 0 
Semantic Transformations 
The semantic transformations of a given formal language are the 
means for moving from object to object in the universe of discourse. 
For example, if the universe of discourse is a model of set 
theory, then the function s such that s(x} = x + {x} is such a semantic 
transformation, where + denotes set union. 
Again, we will insist that a formal language be based on only a 
finite number of semantic transformations. 
A semantic transformation is in general quite complex. It may 
take a sequence of objects into another sequence of objects and thus 
both its doma in and its range may be subdirect products of sem:antic 
categories, Here range mea ns the image of the domain under the 
given semantic transformation. 
Let rn. be an integer. 
Definition: T = {T. / j E m} is a collection of semantic transformations 
J 
over K = {Ci Ii E n} , if for each j E m the following hold: 
i} There exists a domain function, d . , from an ·integer 
J 
6. to ·n, 
J 
d.:6. -n, 
J J 
ii} There exists a range function, r. , from an integer 
J 
p. ton , 
J 
r.:p. - n, and 
J J 
iii) T. is a function from a sub direc t product of 
J 
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cd.(l)x cd.(2) x. . . x c 
- 1) d. (o . 
J J J J 
to a subdirect product of 
c x c 
r. (2) x • c r. (1) . . x 
r. (p . - 1) J J . J J 
The domain functions, d. , and the range functions, r. , select 
J J 
the p articul ar semantic categories used to form the direct products 
contain ing the domain and range of each semantic transformation. 
The "property " that a semantic c a t egory is to correspond to, is 
the property of being a projection of the domain or image of a 
semantic transformation. We can say that a semantic category is a 
domain or image class of a sernantic transformation. 
Structural Semantic Transformations 
A semantic transformation may be closely related to it s universe 
of discourse in that it depends only upon the given relational struc-
ture. To make this notion precise, consider any permution, 'I , of 
U We write x'{ for the value of'{ when applied to x. We say that 
0 
'{ commutes with a semantic transformation, T , if 
whenever 
= 
D efinition : A semantic transforina tion is structural if it commutes 
with every permutation that preserves the rela tions R 1 , R 2 , •.• , of 
u. 
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As an exa1nple, let M = < M , e, 0 > be a model of set theory, · 
0 
where e is the binary relation "is a member of" and 0 is the empty 
set. The proper automorphisms of M are determined by permuta-
tions of the individuals of the set theory which are not the empty set, 
and any such permutation determines an automorphism. Then the 
function Li st (x ) = { {y} I ye x} is structural. That is, the value of 
List (x) depends only on the set-theoretical structure of x and not on 
whether x is a particular set or indiv idual. 
If the model of set theory is pure, that is, the o n ly individual is 
the empty set, then there are no proper automorphisms of the inodel; 
every semantic transformation is structural. This is a consequence 
of the extensionality of pure set theory, and suggests that one of the 
reasons for the general acceptance of set theory as a foundation for 
mathematics is the completely structural character of a pure set 
theory. 
Constructive Semantic Transformations 
A semantic transformation may be constructive . By this we mean 
that the semantic transformation can be defined in terms of given 
primitive semantic transforinations by given methods of construction. 
To fonnalize this notion in any particular c ase , one must d ec ide upon 
the primitive semantic transformations and what methods will be 
considered constructive. 
The following example i s a straight-forward generalization of the 
methods of recursive function theory, as found in Kleene [ 18 J or 
Davis [9 ], and illustrates one notion of constructiv ity. 
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The universe of discourse is a model of set theory. A semanti c 
transformation, T is constructive if there exists a finite class of 
defining equations from which the values of T can be effectively 
computed in terms of the arguments of T • The defining equations 
are written in terms of the primitive functions which follow: set 
union, written + ; s et inter section, written • ; set difference, - ; 
and the sing l eton function, s • s(x) is tha t set whose sole men1ber is 
x , that is, s(x) = {x } , Clea rly these primitive functions are struc-
tural. To give power to the r ecursive d efinitions , we include a 
choice function, c , among the primitive functions. The choic e func-
tion is undefined on the i ndividuals of the model. If the model of set 
theory includes two or more individuals other than the empty set, no 
choic e function is structural. 
We can now give the defining equations for the semantic transfor-
mation List(x ) • 
List(x ) = s( s c x ) + List(x - s c x} 
List(O) = 0 
where s c x means s(c(x}} and 0 i s the name of the empty set. We 
include equations of the form 
Li st (a } = a 
for every i ndividual a 1n U • 
To show that List is structural and constructive on finite sets, 
we first require that U have but a finite number of individuals, in 
which case the set of defining equa tions is finite. Now, by induction, 
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List ( {x1 , •.• , xn}) = { {x1 }, ••• , {xn}} , independent of the choice 
function, c • Hence, List is well defined and structural. Since List 
is only defined on finite sets, its domain is the semantic category of 
finite sets and its range is the cla ss of those finite sets whose 
elements are singleton sets, 
If a formal language is defined over a model of set theory, it 
seems reasonable to insist that the semantic transformations of the 
language depend only on the set-theoretica l structure of the model, 
that is, that they be structural, and further, that they be constructive 
as illustrated above. Thompson [ 32 J has taken this approach. In 
Chapter III we indicate that the structural semantic transformations 
are essentially trivial when the universe of discourse is a model of 
part theory. 
Refer ents 
Continuing to d efine the general notion of a formal l anguage , we 
requir e a set of referents, Each referent is an entry point into th e 
semantic structure of the formal l anguage , the obj ect that a word of 
the forinal l anguage names. 
Definition: Let K = {C. j i E n} be a collection of semantic categories, 
l 
If X is a subclass of the "union of the C. , then X is a collection of 
l 
referents. 
D efinition of~ Formal Language 
A formal language is a triple < T, K, X> over a given universe 
of discourse U such that : 
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i} K is a finite collection of semantic categories over U , 
ii} T is a finite collection of semantic transformations over 
K 
' 
and 
iii} X is a finite collection of referents over K • 
Syntax 
We discuss the relationship between a formal language and the 
usual notions of syntax as given in [32 ], [3 ], or [33 ]. 
A syntax is a quadruple <V, W, G, D> where: V and Ware 
finite classes of abstract symbols such that W c V • V is the vocab-
ulary of the syntax and W is the class of terminal symbols, or words. 
G is a disjoint union of G and G , each of which is a finite class of 
v w 
grammar rules. A grammar rule is an ordered pair of strings over 
V , written a - f3 , where f3 may be substituted for any occurrence of 
a as a substring in a string to produce a new string. The rules of 
G are over V-W , and the rules of G are of the form v - w 
v w 
where v E V-W and w E W • Dis a finite class of distinguished 
strings. 
The language of the syntax< V, W, G, D > is that class of strings 
over W which can be produced from D by repeated application of the 
grarnn1ar rules. 
The connection between a formal language and a syntax is given 
by the following correspon dence. 
If there exists a one-to-one correspondence, ¢ , between: 
i} X and W , 
ii} Kand V-W such tha t if xE X and xE C. then 
l 
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if> (C.) - if> (x) is a grammar rule of G , and 
1 w 
iii) T and G such that if TE T has range in 
v 
C. X •o• X 
and domain in 
grammar rule 
ef>(C. )ef>(C . ) 
31 J2 
x ·~· x c. \s 
J1 
then <P (T) is the 
then the syntax< V, W, G, D > is a proposed syntax for the formal 
language < T, K, X>. If, in addition , for each string d E D there is 
a semantic transformation with range in C. x ••• xC. 
J1 JP 
such that 
ef>(C. ) •• • ef>(C. ) = d then <V, 
J 1 J p 
W, G, D > is a syntax for the formal 
l anguage < T, K, X> • 
One may wish to impose additional restrictions on D , the class 
of preferred strings, so that for each d E D, starting fro1n r eferents , 
and by repeated applications of semantic transformations in T , it is 
possible to reach some <y 1 , ... ' 
sponds to d E D • 
y >cC.x ••• 
p J 1 
x C. which corre-
Jp 
A significant aspect of the corr espondence between the formal 
l anguage and its syntax is the relationship between the repeated 
applications of grammar rules and compos ition of the semantic 
transformations. 
We can describe the correspondence, <P , between the syntax and 
semantics as a contra variant functor [24 ], as i ndicated by the 
following diagrams: 
x E C 
w v 
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and 
T ; c. X •cio x c. c. x CICl-CI x c. 
11 io J1 JP 
<fit <Pi 
cP (T ); v. v . 
-
v. v . 
11 16 J1 JP 
Note that the language of the syntax is in general larger than the 
class of meaningful strings, where "meaningful 11 means: m a pping the 
strings into sequences of referents via cfi and applying semantic 
transforn1ations to obta in sequences of ob j ects in th e correct semantic 
categori es to correspond to an element of D , The syntactic l anguage 
is larger since the range of a semantic transformation may be a 
subdirect product of it s i mage semantic c ategories, thus dis a llowing 
certain compositions of semantic transformations which appear 
syntactica lly corre ct, Similarly, if the do1nain of a semantic tran s -
form a tion is the subdir ect product of semantic categor ies, certa in 
string s of wor d s may b e syntactically corr e ct, while t heir s emantic 
counterpa rt will not be in the domai n of any s emantic transformation, 
This is reasonable in view of Chomsky 's example [2, p. 15] 
"Gr een ideas sleep furiously . 11 , 
which, while syntactic a lly corre ct, is u sually considere d to b e mean-
ingless . 
A grammar rule is called context-free if it is of t he form v - f3 
where v is a single s ymbol of V - W • If a semantic transformation i s 
in corre spondence with a context-free grammar rul e , the semantic 
transfonnation is a l so called context-free. A context- free semantic 
transformation resembles the usual mathematical function, as i s 
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illustrated by the following commuting diag r am. 
T c. X ••o X c. c 
11 lo p 
l <P l <P 
cP(T): v. v . 
-
v 
11 lo p 
The above diagram a lso illustrat es that we c an conside r a 
grammar rul e as th e abstraction of th e corresponding semantic 
transformation to the range and domain o f the semantic tran sforma-
tion. We c an say that the syntax i s the surface effect of a s emantic 
system. 
What we have called here a fo rmal l anguage c an a l s o be consider-
ed the abstract semantics for the usual notion of a syntactic l anguage , 
as in Ginsberg [11 ]. Since we have insisted upon a one -to-one 
corr espondence between the formal l anguage (semantics ) and a syntax 
fo r it, we can construct a syntax for a g iven formal l anguage if 
n ecessary, and so we will consider on ly formal l anguages in the 
sequel. 
D er ived Semantic Transformations 
Semantic transformations can be composed in a manner similar to 
functiona l composition, although in a more complex f a shion. The 
compositions of semantic transformations into derived semantic 
transformations is entirely ana logous to the use of several grammar 
r ules in the production of one syntactic string from another. 
A s a syntactic exa mple, suppose we have the grammar r ules 
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where o: , 13 , "( , o are strings over the non-terminal vocabulary, 
V-W • Then we can derive [3 ri o from o: by applying the rules in the 
above order. We will mirror just this kind of process in composing 
semantic transformations. 
Consider the following direct product of semantic categories 
A l x • • • x A a x B l x • . • x Bb x Cl x • • • x Cc 
where either a or b may be 0, 
If we have a semantic transformation, T 1 , with domain a 
subdirect product of 
and range a subdirect product of 
then we may "derive" a subdirect product, K , of 
corresponding to the image of Tl • If this subdirect product overlaps 
the don1ain of a semantic transforma tion, T2 , that is, the domain of 
T2 is a subdir ec t product of 
A 1 x ... x Aa x D 1 x ... x Dd x c 1 x ... x Cc 
which has a non-null intersection with K , then we may compose T 1 
and T2 to obtain a derived semantic transformation whose domain is 
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the subdirect product of 
A l x ••• x A a x B l x ••• x Bb x C l x ••• x Cc 
determined by 'f 1 and the extent of the inter section with the domain 
of ,-2 , and whose range is a subdirect product of 
where the range of ,-2 is also a subdirect product of E 1 x ••• x Ee. 
Because a derived semantic transformation depends on the 
subdirect product structure of the participa ting semantic transforma-
tion, derivations which are syntactica lly correct (that is, the 
appropriate direct products of semantic categories overlap), may not 
be semantically allowed. A study of syntax alone may not enable one 
to determine what phrases of a l anguage are meaningful. If the 
domain and rang e of every semantic transformation are direct 
products of semantic c ateg ories, then every synta ctically correct 
phrase is meaningful, at l east in the sense that a derived semantic 
transformation can be applied to the objects corresponding to the 
words of the phrase . 
The analysis of syntax in terms of semantic transformations 
suggests why linguists are curren tly using transformational gram-
mars to study the regula rities of natural language . Transformational 
gramma rs [ 4, 5 J allow for more complex rules for transforming one 
string into another than simply repla cing the occurrence of on e string 
for another , as we have de s cribe d above. 
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Definable Objects 
What objects in a universe of discourse are definable by a formal 
language over that universe? There does not appear to be a unique 
answer to this question, so we will d efine and di scuss two possible 
answers. 
First we will agree that the referents of a given formal language 
are definable objects. Each referent corresponds to a word in the 
vocabulary of the syntax, i. e,, objects with a name. Now suppose 
we have sequence of definable obj ects , for example a sequence of 
referents, (r 1 , ••• , rn) , togethe r with a semantic transformation, 
T, definedon (r 1 , ... , rn)suchthat 
Then we can agree tha t x is also a definable object. For example, 
the obj ect defined by "All red ships are red. 11 is the obj ect corre-
sponding to the word ' 1true. 11 
However, if (r 1 , •.• , rn) is a sequence of definable objects and 
it is not clear that each of x 1 ••• , ~ is a definable object, if we 
assmne they are not otherwise d efinable. Thi s obscurity leads to the 
two d efinitions of definable obj ects. The first declares that the x. 
l 
are not d efinable; the second admits each of the x. as a definable 
l 
object, but only in the conte J>..'t of the remaining x 1 , ..• , ~ • 
Definition: An object, x, of a g iven universe of discourse, U , is 
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context-fr ee definable relative to the formal l anguage < T, K, X> if 
it is a referent in X or if there is a sequence of referents 
(r , ••• , r ) and a semantic transformation, T , derived from the 
1 n 
transformations of T , such that 
Definition: An obj ect, x, of a given universe of discourse, U, is 
contextually definable relative to the formal language < T, K, X> if 
it is a refer ent in X or if there is a sequence of referents 
(r 1 , •··, rn) and a semantic transformation, T, derived from the 
transformations of T , such that 
= 
and for some i ~ n , x. = x , 
l 
In the first d efinition, an object may be context-free definable 
although some of the semantic transformations in T used to d efine the 
obj ect are not context-free semantic transformations. In the second 
definition, an obj ect , x. , is contextually definable only if the objects 
l 
entering into the derivation of (x 1 , ... , xn) from (r 1 , ••. , rn) are all 
contextually definable, We have the obvious corollary of the above 
definitions that every context-free definable object is contextually 
definable, 
The following example illustrates the notion of definable object. 
Suppose 112 11 is the name of a defina ble object in the universe of 
discourse, and suppose there is a semantic transformation whose 
value is the square root of its argument, Then, 1. 4 14 ... i s a defin-
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able object of the given universe. 
Sentences 
So far we have not discussed the question of what constitutes a 
sentence of a formal language. Syntactically, a sentence, as a 
phrase, is a distinguished string of the syntax, usually consisting of 
one symbol. As for words, a sentence is any string of words , i.e., 
any string over W , which can be produced by the repeated application 
of grammar rules from the distinguished string. This definition of a 
sentence, while mathematically productive (for example, see 
Ginsberg [ 11 ]), seems to be imposed on the syntax instead of arising 
naturally from the given language structure. In Chapter VI, we 
suggest possibilities for defining a sentence which m a y be more 
"natural". 
We mirror the above definition of a sentence in the semantic 
structure by selecting a distinguish e d semantic category, S • The 
syntactic counterpart of S is a distinguishe d string in D . If there is 
a sequence of referents (r 1 , ••• , r ) and a derived semantic trans-. n 
formation, 'T , such that 
we say that the string of words corresponding to (r 1 , ... , rn) is a 
sentence, and that 'T is a sentential sernantic trans formation. If we 
feel that a sentence must b e either "true " or 11f a lse", then the seman-
tic category S is a class consisting of two objects, say 0 and 1 • In a 
multi-valued logic system, Sis a class consisting of as many distinct 
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object s as there are values to the logic, and if a sentence possesses 
a "probability" of being true, then S is the unit interval of the real 
line. Because of the apparent artificiality of the above definition of a 
sentence , we will consider d efinabl e objects and the semantic coun-
terpart of phrases, rather than sentences, to be the basic units of 
meaning in the sequel. 
Ana lytic vs. Productive Language Models 
We have tr eated the semantic transformations of a formal 
language as analytic transformations. That is, as the r ec ipient of a 
sequence of words would analyze the phrase to discover its meaning. 
At the same time, the syntax has been treated productively. Starting 
with a distinguished phrase, grammar rules are repeatedly applied 
until a string of words over the terminal vocabulary results. 
However , by l etting the semantics determine the syntax, we are in 
effect using the syntactic structure in an analytic manner as well. 
A complete definition of a formal l anguage should include a 
method for synthesizing sequences of utterable words . It should 
provide for transforming definable objects into sequences of refer-
ent s , which in tur n correspond to strings of words . One possibility 
is to insist that every semantic transformation be invertible, so that 
it could be used either analytically or productively; another is that 
different collections of semantic transformations are used to produce 
phrases and to recognize phrases. 
We will concentrate on analytic formal languages, and leave their 
exact relationship to productive forn1 a l langua ges an open problem. 
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III. PART THEORY 
We mentioned that the universe of discourse can always be 
considered to be a model of set theory. This implies that we are 
willing to m a ke certain strong ontological assumptions about the 
universe of discourse, n arnely that various infinite sets exist and 
that the world is atomic and almost well-founded. By atomic, we 
mean that there are entities which h ave no proper subsets other than 
the empty set and that every entity is a union of atomic sets. By 
almost well-founded, we mean that the axiom of regularity holds for 
all sets except possibly certain individua l s which have no members 
but are not the empty set. 
Presumably there is no difficulty about accepting finite sets. 
However, to have a set theory, we must admit some very large sets, 
such as the continuum, and impredicatively d efine d sets. Even the 
set of integers may be suspect due to the following reasoning. We 
define the integers by stating certain properties of the successor 
function . This statement is a linguistic process and we can argue 
that the set of integers is actually just the lingui stic statement 
defining the integers . For mathematics, this distinction makes no 
differ ence , for we still have entities satisfying the axioms of set 
theory. However , in the view of set theory in which only linguistic 
elements exist, the only sets are those which can be defined by a 
formula of set th e ory. This i s very close to the constructivist point 
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of view [ 6, 13] in which the continuum, for example, does not seem 
to match our intuition regarding the real line , This linguistic view 
of set theory can be said to regar d l arge sets as fictions, As Cohen 
observes, "The great defect with this view is that it l eaves unexplain-
ed why this fiction is successful and how a presumably incorrect 
intuition has led us to such a remarkable system, " [ 6, p. 150 ]. 
The material in Chapter V suggests an explanation of why this fiction 
is successful, 
The second difficulty with set theory is its atomic character , 
While obviously useful for mathematics, it is not clear that we can 
adequately model th e real world in set theory p artly because of this 
property. If we model an electron as a set we must decide what its 
elements are to be. For different purposes we model it differ ently, 
for example as a collection of quantum states or as a point charge. 
It is not clear that a single model of an electron can subsume all the 
models of an electron that we may w ish to make , e specially consider-
ing that new properties of electrons may be discovered, fo r example, 
superconductivity, What appears to be required is a model of the 
world which allows for new properties of entities to be discovered 
and new interre l ationships to be explored. 
The fact that almost everything must be constructed on the empty 
set i s another problem with set theory. Thi s is closely related to 
atomicity, and l eads to the same conclusion that every interrelation-
ship among entities modeled by sets and individuals is inherent in the 
set theory, and there is no room for discoveries, Suppose the set 
theory is pure, that is, there are no indiv idua ls, Then every set is 
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well-founded and let us consider modeling the electron again. An 
electron in the model is some complicated set, but all of whose 
elements are set-theoretical constructions built on top of nothing, 
that is, on the empty set. If we find this notion philosophically 
unpalatable, then we can consider including some individuals in our 
set theory. Now the electron set can have individuals as members of 
members of... • However, there is nothing within set theory which 
allows us to distinguish between individuals and thus between sets 
with the same structure over "different" individuals. So the electron 
set's elements are set-theoretical constructions built on top of 
nothing or on top of indistinguishable structureless somethings. This 
does not appear any more acceptable than a pure set theory. 
Since accepting set theory as the universe of discourse requires 
accepting atomicity, well-foundednes s, and the existence of large and 
strangely defined sets, and these lead to philosophical difficulties, 
we ask what can be accomplished by making weaker ontologica l 
assumptions than those required by set theory. We will assume only 
that an entity c an be part of another entity. The sole predicate of the 
theory is the notion "x is a part of y", formalized as x rr y • The 
theory of the part-whole relationship as developed in the next section 
requires only three axio~s and one axiom schema, indicative of the 
weaker ontology. Earlier discussions of the theory of parts appear 
in Goodman [ 14] and Tar ski [2 9 ]. Tar ski's axiom system d epends 
on the availability of a set theory. The approach here is to develop 
part theory independently of set theo ry. Goodrnan considers his part 
theory to be a calculus of individuals . Our axiom system is similar 
-24-
in intent to Goodman 's, although more completely formalized. We 
assurn e that the only entities are the "individua ls". 
The theory of parts i ncludes a means of construct ing entities 
from parts described by a formula, in analogy to the axiom of 
replacement of set theory. However, the entities formed in this way 
do not appear to have a diffe r ent cha r a cter than other p arts . In set 
theory, our i n tuition becomes shakier as we m ove from the integer s 
to the countable ordinals to the continuum and i mpredicatively d efined 
sets. In p ar t theory, the world is far more homogeneous and every 
part has about the same credibility as a "r eal" entity. Since a model 
of p art theory need not have atoms, we c an l a b e l c ert a in parts of an 
electron as distinguished and then fin d proper p arts of the distin-
guished p a rts to explore and so on. 
Well-foundedness does not apply to the theory of parts, and we 
can l abel a particular part as an e l ectron without having specified 
anything about it s structure. Because o f homogeneity, the electron 
looks approximatel y like any other part, but we accept this situation 
as follows . The "s tructure" of any part is imposed on it by an 
obs erver . As the formal development shows , t he homegeneity of 
p arts means that any t w o parts c an have the same "structure ". 
Another way of saying this i s that every part can have any structure 
and the particular structure of a p ar t, say an electron, is that one 
selected by an observer. This ontological position i s deve l oped 
forina lly i n Chapter IV, with a for mal l anguage replacing an 
"observer". As we will see , we c an recover a set theory from 
within a model of part theory, den1onstr a ting the existence of any 
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particular set-theory-based structure tha t we please. 
As a method of exploring linguistic and mathematical notions, 
the theory of parts seems to be a powerful tool. It also seems to be 
in line with some current thought in the philosophy and history of 
science [26, 20 ]. As to whether it is a completely adequate model of 
reality, the answer is of course no. It does seem to offer possibili-
ties for furthering our understanding of formal linguistics and the 
relationship between a language and its universe of discourse. 
Axioms and Basic Theorems 
This axiomitization of part theory was developed by 
F. B. Thompson. Some of the theorems in this section are due to 
F. B. Thompson, the remainder to R. Lambert [21 ]. The theorems 
are stated here without proof, but we attempt to give the intuition 
behind the axioms and b as ic theorems of the system, 
Axiom 1: Va Vb[a = b - Vc(c rra ._ ... c rrb)] • 
a is the same entity as b if and only if they share all their 
parts in common. This axiom of extensionality for parts could alter-
nately be taken as a definition of equality in part theory. Note that a 
and b are not necessarily parts of any entity. 
Axiom 2: VaVb[arrb -3:c(arrc) &V d(d rra - drrb)] . 
a is a part of b if and only if a is p art of something and every 
part of a is a part of b • This axiom is a strong form of transitivity 
for p ar ts. 
The following three theorems establish that rr is a partial order-
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ing. 
Theorem 3: Va[3:c(a1Tc)-.. a1Ta] • 
Theorem 4 : VaVb[a1Tb & b1Ta- a= b] • 
Theorem 5: VaVbVc[a1Tb &b1T c- a1Tc] • 
Definition 6: Let F(a; x , ••• , x 1 ) b e a formula of th e lowe r o n-
predicate calculus in whi ch b , c , d and e are not fr ee . The only 
pr edicat e in F is 1T and x , ••• , x 1 are the n ames of n entities. o n-
Then, c 1T Pa [F(a ; x
0
, •• • , xn- l)] if and only if 
Vd[d1Tc-3:a3:e[F(a; x, •• • , x 1 ) &e1Ta&e1Td ]] &3:f (c1Tf). o n-
P [F(a)] i s that entity formed by "conglomerating" all the a 
a 
such that F(a) • In forming the c ongl omerate , parts other than the a 
satisfying F(a) may be parts of the conglomerate and the definition 
specifies which parts are to be i ncluded. In words , c is a p art of the 
conglornerate i f every part of c meets some a satisfying F(a) • This 
d efinition and the following axiom schema hold a position in the 
theory of parts analogous to the axiom of replacement in Zerrn.elo-
Fraenkel set theory, While the axiom of r e placement guarantees 
that the range of a function i s a set, here the following axiom schema 
gua r antees that each con.glomerate exists and is the l east upper 
bound to the collection of a s atisfying F (a ) • That is, we c an find an 
entity whose parts are just those defined by the formula F together 
with all of their parts and the various combinations of these. 
Axiom Schema 7 : 3:b V c [c 1Tb - c 1T Pa [F(a; x
0
, ••• ' x l)J] • n-
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Theorem8: 3:!bVc[cTib...-cTIP [F(a; x, ••. , x 1 )]]. a o n-
The conglomerate is unique and thus is the least upper bound, 
with respect to the partial ordering 1T , to the collection of a sati sfy-
ing F(a) • 
Axiom 9: VaVb[1 a1Tb &3:c(a1Tc)- 3:d(d 1Ta &Ve 1 [e1Td &e1Tb])] • 
If a is not a p art of b and a is part of something, then there is 
a p art of a which i s disjoint from b , that is, has no part in common 
with b • This axiom guarantees that a and b are distinguishable by 
some part which they do not share. The following theoren1 illustra tes 
t h is. 
Theorem 10: VaVb[aTib- Vc(cTia - 3:d(d1Tc &d1Tb)) & 3:e(a1Te)) 
a is a part of b if and only if every part of a has a p art in 
common with b and a is p art of sorn.ething. 
The or em 11: Vb[b =P [aTib] ] 
. a 
This theorem shows that the theory of p arts is well-formed; 
b is the conglomerate or l east upp er bound of the collection of its 
part s and since every p art c an be defined by a formula, every part 
has roughly the same d egree of cr edibility. 
A xioms 1, 2, and 9 together with axiom schema 7 consti tute the 
main collection of axioms of the theory of parts. The remaining 
d efinitions and theorems develop the theory far enough to make it 
clear that a Bool ean algebra c an be a model of part theory. 
D efinition 12: l =P [a=a ] a . 
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1 is the universe of parts, obtaine d by taking the conglomer-
ate over a t a utology. 
Theorem 13: Va[arrl - 3:b(arrb)] • 
Every entity which is a p art is a part of the universe and 
vice versa. 
Definition 14: b + c = P [arrb V arrc] • 
a 
This defines the union of the p arts b and c , but does not 
guarantee that b + c is a part of the universe. 
Theoreml5: b+c=P[a=bVa=c]. 
a 
This theorem illustrat es the nature of conglomerating. 
P [a = b V a = c J has as parts every part of b and every part of c 
a 
as the following theorem shows. 
Theorem 16: Va Vb\fc[arrb V arrc - arrb + c] • 
Theorem 17: VbVcVd[( Va [arrbV arrc -- arrd] &[b+crrl])-b+crrd]. 
If b + c is a part of the universe, then b + c is the least upper 
bound of b and c • 
Definition 18: b • c = P [arr b & arr c J • 
a . 
This d efines the intersection of two p arts , which may not 
always exist as a part of the universe. 
Theor em 19: Va VbVc[arrb & arrc - arrb• c] • 
b · c is the greatest lower bound of b and c • 
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Theorem 2 0: Vb Ve [b • c n 1 - b • c n c & b • c n b] • 
If b • c is part of the universe, then it is a part of b and a part 
of c • 
Definition 21: 0 = P [a f- a] • 
a 
Zero is the conglomerate over a contradiction. Zero is not 
part of any entity and has no parts as the following two theorems 
show. This is one of the more pleasing aspects of the theory of 
parts. Zero is the only entity without parts and can be said to be 
"nothing at all 11. This is contrasted with the empty set which has 
many relations with the remaining sets, such as being a subs et of 
every set and being a member of certain sets. 
Theorem 22: 1 [On1] • 
Zero is not a part of the universe, so by Theorem 13, it is 
not a part of any entity. 
Theorem 23: Va[(Vb 1 (bna)) - a= OJ • 
Zero has no parts, including itself, and is the only such 
entity. 
Theorem24: VbVc[ 1 3:a (a1Tb&a1Tc)-b·c=0]. 
band c h a ve no p a rt in cornmon if and on ly if their inter sec-
tion is zero. This theor e m is another indication tha t the theory is 
well - form e d. 
Theor e m 25: 3:b 3:c [b n 1 & c n 1 & b f- c] -
1 Vb V c [b 1T 1 & c 1T 1 - b • c Tr 1 J • 
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Theorem 26: Vb[b+O = b] • 
Theorem 2 7: Vb [b • 0 = 0] • 
The above three theorems illustrate the relations between zero 
and other entities. 
Theorem 28: Va[a1Tb·c - a1Tb &a1Tc] • 
Definition 29: 15 = P [Vc(c1Ta- 1 C1Tb)] • a 
This defines the complement of b , which is unique by 
theorem 8 • 
~ 
Theorem 30: 0 = 1 & 1 = 0 • 
Theorem 31: Va Vb 1 [a1Tb & a1To] • 
b and its complement are disjoint. 
Theorem 32: Va[a+a = 1] • 
Part Theory and Boolean Algebra 
The theorern.s of the previous section indicate that a model of 
part theory is also a model of a Boolean algebra. What Boolean 
· algebras are models of part theory? The answer is only very 
uniform Boolean algebras. We will show that a Boolean algebra 
which is a direct product of an atomic Boolean algebra a!:'.d an atom-
less Boolean algebra is a model of part theory. We let a 1Tb 
correspond to (a ~ b & a f: 0) in the Boolean algebra and proceed to 
prove the axioms of part theory as theorems of Boolean algebra. As 
we will demonstrate, all of the axioms are straight-forward to prove, 
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except axiom schema 7. The proof of axiom schema 7 requires that 
the least upper bound of 
fa\ F(a ; x , •.• , x 1)} o n-
e x ist in the Boolean algebra. This existence proof is obtained by 
applying the method of elimination of quantifiers [ 31 J to 
F(a; x , ••• , x 1 ) , reducing this formula to a standard form for o n-
which it is possible to show t he existence of the l east upper bound. 
Since the proof outlined here i s l ong, it has been r elegated to the 
appendix. The proof u ses, crit i cally and in two different places, 
t hat the Boolean algebra i s a direct product of atomic and atomless 
f actors. T his makes it most likely that the direct product condition 
i s necessary i n order that a Boolean algebra be a model of part 
theory. Now, assuming that ~ a exists , we prove the axioms of 
F(a ) 
part theory as Boolean algebraic theorems. 
Let a nb be interprete d as (a ::; b & a f; 0) in the Boolean algebra. 
The operations in the proofs to follow are Boolean algebraic and the 
0 and 1 of part theory will be interpreted as the 0 and 1 of the 
Boolean algebra, 
Axiom 1: Va Vb[a = b - Vc(c na ....._.. c nb)] 
Proof: Assume a = b • Then c ::; a i f and only if c ::; b • Now assume 
Vc(c na .-. c nb ). In particular , (a ::; a & a f; 0) - (a ::; b & a f; 0) 
and b ~ b - b ~a , hence a = b , 
Axiom 2: Va Vb[anb ...- 3:c(anc ) & Vd(dna - dnb)]) 
Proof: Assume a nb • Then a ~ a and every d l ess than or equal to 
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a is also le ss than or equal to b • Now assurne 
3:c(a1Tc) & Vd(drra -d1Tb). Then if 1 (a -:Sb), the re is an e -:Sa 
such that..., (e -:S b) , con tradiction. 
Axiom schema 7: 3:bVc[crrb ...- C1TP [F(a)]] where we have drop-
a 
ped the p a ramete rs x , ••• , x 1 in F for cla rity. o n-
We requir e t w o l emma s b efore proceeding w ith the proof of 
axiom schema 7. 
Lemma 1: I; a exists and is equal to a. 
e-:Sa 
Proof: We k now that a is an upp e r bound to the set {e I e-:Sa } • Since 
a E {e I e-:Sa} , it is the l east upper bound, 
Lemma 2: If I; a exists, then 
F(a ) 
L, a = 
F(a ) 
I; [I; e] 
F(a ) e-:Sa 
= L, e 
e -:Sa&F (a ) 
Proof: Thi s i s a simple application of i nfinite associativity, as in 
Sikorski [2 8 , p . 59 J. 
We turn to the proof of axiom schema 7. Reca ll that c rr P [F( a )] 
a 
if and only if 
Vd[d rr c - 3:a3:e[F(a) & erra &e1Td ]] & 3:f(c rrf ) • 
Consider b = I; a, which exists by the proof i n the appendix, By 
F(a ) 
l emma 2, b = I; e • Consider any c-:Sb which is not 0 . 
e -:Sa&F {a ) 
Fir st of all, 3:f (crrf ) since for all c 
' 
c .::; 1 • Now cons ider any 
d -:S c whi ch is not 0 • Suppos e for all e i n {e I e -:S a & e ~ 0 & F(a)} 
i t is the c ase that e 4 d • Then d is disjoint from each e so that 
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d - b-!- 0, contradicting d ~ b. Hence, 3:a3:e[F(a) & erra & errd] • 
Now suppose there exists a c satisfying 
Vd[drrc 3:a3:e(F(a) & erra & errd)] We will show that 
c ~ b = I; a , Suppose the contrary. Then x = c - b is not zero 
F(a) 
and x ~ c, But then 3:a3:e(F(a) & e ~a & e ~x & e f- 0) which 
implies that e ~ b, and e ~ b & e ~ x contradicts X • b = 0 • 
The Model 
If we accept "is a part of" as th e funda1nental notion for discuss-
ing i nformational entities , then we must face the question of how 
many parts the universe possesses. The answer m .ust be an infinite 
number. Conside r some part, say a sheet of paper. It possesses 
conc eptual parts like the top two-thirds and the margin. These 
parts are potentially infinite. Are there any parts which possess no 
proper subparts, that is, are there any parts which are atoms? 
Assuming tha t there are no atoms, we can always divide any part of 
the universe into smaller subpa rts. For example, an electron can be 
divide d into its mass, momentum, position, charge, and so on, 
while the electron's mass can be divided into re st mass and energy 
mass, and so on as long as we please. There is no claim here tha t 
the parts i nto which we divide the electron are unique or necessarily 
useful for physical theory. The only claim is that we always find a 
prope r p ar t of any p art of an electron. 
The assumption of atomlessness c an be formali ze d as an addition-
al axiom of part theory as follows : 
Va [ a f- 0 - 3: b (b rr a & b f- a)] . 
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With this axiom, only the atomless, therefor e infinit e , Boolean 
algebras are models of p art theory. We know from the Lowenheim-
Skolem theorem that any set of axioms has a countable model. In 
p a rticular, the theory of a tomless p arts has a countable model. 
Without becoming involved in model-theoretic considerations we 
present a countable atomless Boolean algebra, P , as a mode l of 
part theory. Conside r h a lf-op en interva ls (x, y J such that 
0 ~ x , y ~ 1 and such that x and y are rational. Each such interval 
is a part where (x1 , y 1 J1T (x2 , Yz J if and only if x 1 ~ x 2 and 
y 1 ~ Yz • (0, 1] is the universal p a rt of part theory and the unit of 
the Boolean algebra. Finite unions of parts are p art s. Furthermore, 
this model is i somorphic to every countable atomless Boolean 
algebra and to the free Boolean algebra on a countabl e number of 
generators [ 10, p. 54 ]. Pis the smallest of the class of models we 
consider. The rema ining sections of this cha pter discuss properties 
of P. Larger models, under suitable conditions, also possess· these 
properties. 
Size 
The size of each part of P can be d efined by defining a measure 
on P. Such a measure exists . For example, a normed finitely 
additive effective measure can be obtained as follows [10; p. 56 ]: 
since each part of P is uniquely expressible as a finit e union of 
disjoint parts, say, p = K~ (x ., y . J , we define the measure, µ , on 
iEn 1 i 
each part as µ (p) = . ~ (y . - x.) , whe re here ~ means addition and 
i E:n i i 
y. - x. is the l ength of the interval (x. , y. ]. Define the measure of 
1 1 1 1 
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the zero of P to be 0 • 
The size of a part can be thought of as the importance of the part, 
its probability, or as its "physica l'' size. Also, the measure can be 
used to define a metric on P by s etting the distance between two 
parts, p 1 and Pz , in P to the measure of their symmetric differ ence, 
We prove a lemma us eful in the following section. 
Lemma : Given E > 0 and a sequence of disjoint p arts p 1 , p 2 , ••• , 
if µ(p.) ~ E for each i , then the sequence is finite, p 1 , . •• , p • 1 n 
Proof: µ(p. + p.) = µ(p.) + µ(p.) for all i I= j since p. and p. are 
1 J 1 J 1 J 
disjoint. The measure of the union of at most 1 / E of the p. is equal 
1 
to 1 • Sinc e the measure of all parts i s l ess than or equal to 1 , 
ther e are only a finite number of disjoint parts with measure ~ E • 
Limit Points and Measure 
Let Y ·be a subclass of a model of part theory. A point is a limit 
point of Y if there is a sequence of points in Y which, eventually , do 
not exclude any part of the lim it point and eventually do not include 
?-ny point not part of the limit point. Formally, we have 
Definition: y is a limit ~oint of Y if there i s a sequence y 1 , y 2 , ••. 
of elements of Y such that for any z I= 0 , there exists an N for which 
j > N i mplies z• (y..!..y. ) I= 0. 
J 
To show that this is equivalent to the sentence above the definition, 
let z ::::::: y , z I= 0 • Then for some N and all j > N , 
z . (y ..!.. y .) = z • [ (y. y.) + (y . y.) J = z • y. I= 0 . 
J J J J 
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Hence z is not excluded. Sim ilarly, let z :::;; y , z /:. 0 • Then for 
some N and all j > N , 
z • (y .:.. y.) = z. y. y. = z. y. /:. 0 
J J J 
so that z is not include d. 
Let P be the model of p a rt the ory previously defined and l e t µ be the 
normed finit e ly additive effective measure we hav e define d on it. We 
define d the distance between x and yin P by d{x, y) = µ(x.:.. y) • We 
wish to show that a point is a limit p oint of a s e quence in P if and 
only i f it is a limit poin t in the metric space determine d by the meas-
ure. Hence the topol ogy d ete rmined by the definition of limit point 
given above and the metric topology determined by the measure can 
be made to coincide. 
Theor em : y is a lim it poin t of Y if and o n ly if µ(y ~ y.) - 0 as 
1 
i _,.. ro for some sequence y
1
, y 2 , •.• i n Y. 
Proof : Suppose µ (y.:.. yi} _.. 0 as i - 00 for some s equence y 1 , y 2 , ••• 
Conside r any z /:. 0 • z h as non-zero measure since µ, is effective. 
There exists an N such that for all j > N , µ, (y.:.. y.) < µ(z) , and so 
J 
for all j > N, z • (y.:.. y.) /:. 0. For suppose for some k > N, 
J 
z. (y.:.. yk) = 0 . Then z :::;; (y.:.. yk) thus ~i {z} :::;; (y.:.. yk} , contradic-
tion . This shows that y is a lim it point of (y1 , y 2 , ••• } • 
Suppos e y is a limit point defined by the sequence y 1, y 2 , .• • and 
that µ (y .:.. y.) does not converge to 0 • We will show that for some 
1 
E > 0 the r e is an infinite subsequence of y. such that 
1 
µ,(y.:..y.):e:E 
1 
For if µ.(y.:.. y.) does not conve rge to 0 there is an 
1 
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E > 0 such that for all M there exists an i> M such that p. (y ..:... y.) ~ E 
l 
Since y is a limit point, there exists an N such that for all 
j > N (y..:... y.) 1 (y..:... y . ). We form the infinite subsequence as 
l J 
follows: Let M = 1 • Then there is an i 1 such that p.{y..:... y. ) ~ E 
- 11 
i 1 determines an N such that for all j > N (y..:... y. ) 1 (y..:... y.). Now 11 J 
let M = max(i 1 , N) to determine i 2 • Continuing in this way, we have 
ik < ik+ 1 and for each k, p. {y ..:... y ik) ~ E • By the lemma of the 
previous section, the {y..:... y. ) of this subsequence are not disjoint. 
. lk 
In fact, the lemma shows there must be a z t 0 such that 
z ~ (y..:... y. ) for an infinite number of k. This contradicts the 
lk 
assumption that y is a limit point, proving that p. (y..:... y.) - 0 as 
l 
i - ro if y is a limit point. 
Automorphisms 
An automorphism on P is a one-to-one function, g , from P onto 
P such that g(x)rrg(y) iff xrry. If Pis countable and atomless, P 
has 2w automorphisms [10, p. 50 ]. If Pis a model of a static 
world, then the automorphisms model the changes which take place 
in that world. If an automorphism g interchanges two parts, then the 
change which has taken place is that interchange. This notion of 
change is very general and does not l ead directly to a notion of time. 
However, by metrizing the group of automorphisms of P , we c an 
consider time to be a continuous map from the real line to the group 
of automorphisrns. If g and hare automorphisms, define d':' [ g, h] = 
suppd[g(x), h{x)] . 
There are some philosophical difficulties associated with this 
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notion of change, which the following example illustrates. Suppose 
we have a red pencil, which burns and changes to black soot. If the 
redness of the pencil is a part of the pencil, then under the auto-
morphism changing the red pencil into black soot, the "red" part is 
transformed into some part of the soot, and the soot is not red. 
Hence the automorphism does not preserve sensual redness. 
Furthermore, some part of the red pencil must be transformed into 
the "black" part of the soot even though it appears that the red pencil 
has no black part. For the time being, we just accept this difficulty 
as indicating that our notion of change is a rather crude one. We will 
return to this problem in Chapter VI, after having considered the 
relationship between part theory and formal languages. 
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IV. GROUPS OF AUTOMORPHISMS 
In this chapter we develop some of the consequences of consider-
ing a formal language to have a model of part th e ory as its universe 
of discourse, One of these consequences is that the structural 
semantic transformations are the Boolean functions on the model of 
part theory, including the infinite Boolean function s defined in terms 
of the abstraction operation considered i n this cha pte r. The 
interesting semantic transformations are not~ priori structural but 
impose a richer structure on the model of part theory tha n it orig-
inally poss esse d. In this sense we can say that a formal language 
determine s the structure of it s universe of discourse. 
This structure c an be characteriz e d by a group of automorph-
isms. The results in this chapter stem fron~ considering the groups 
of automorphisms associated with formal language s. With each 
formal language we associate the largest group of automorphisms 
under which the fo rrnal l anguage i s invariant. The characterization 
of a forma l l anguage by its associated group is imperfect in the 
sense that several formal l anguages may be associated with a given 
group. However one may then say that these several l anguages all 
give the same structure to the universe of discourse. 
In considering thi s structure, we see that the p arts definable by 
the formal l anguage are those to which it g ives additional structure , 
and undefinable parts are l e ft unrestricted, except i n so far as they 
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are parts of definable entities. The following example illustrates 
several matters which are treated formally in the remainder of the 
chapter. 
Suppose we have a formal language which discusses the interrela-
tionships of objects in a room. The referent words of the l anguage 
may be "desk", "table", and "chair 11 together with function words 
which select particular semantic transformations, such as "to the 
l eft of" and "under ". In this formal language, the l eft two-thirds of 
a desk is an undefinable part. Without additional referents and 
possibly additional semantic transformations, this entity is 
indescribable in the given formal language. In this case a desk is an 
atom in the algebra of definable parts. 
Continuing this example , suppose in the room which i s our 
universe of discourse every desk is to the left of a table. If we 
permute the desks then the structure "every desk is to the left of a 
table" remains invariant. These permutations are in the group of 
the formal language provided they preserve all of the structure 
determined by the formal langua ge. Assuming the permutations of 
desks do preserve the langua ge, we see that two desks cannot be 
distinguished if they are permuted one into the other. As far as this 
formal language is concerned they are indistinguishable and the 
syntactic entities which name or describe them are synonomous , 
The Group of~ Formal Lang uag e 
Let F = < T, K, X > be a formal l a nguag e over a model of part 
theory, P • 
Definition: Let G be a subgroup of the group of all automorphisms of 
P • G is the group of the formal language F if for every basic or 
derived semantic transformation, T , of F and every sequence 
(x1, ••• , xn} of referents in X such that 
and for every g in G , 
Unde r this definition, G is the group of the formal language F if 
every autornorphis1n in G commutes with every semantic transforma-
tion of F whenever the semantic transformation is defined. We may 
symbolize the fact that the automorphism g commutes with the 
semantic transfonnation T , in the sense of the definition, by 
g T = T g • The group G is said to leave the formal language F invar-
iant since for each change in G and each semantic transformation of 
F we obtain the same result no matter whether the change or the 
semantic transformation is done first. 
We now define indistinguishability of parts. 
. . 
Definition: 6. is an orbit of P under G if 6. is a subclass of P and for 
every x and y in 6. there .is a g in G such that g(x} = y • 
Definition: Let GF be the group of the formal language F • If two 
parts are in the sa1n e orbit under GF , then they are indistinguish-
able by F. 
As another exa mple of indistinguishability suppose we have a 
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formal language which includes the word "Scott" and the phrase 
"author of Waverly''. "Scott" is interpreted as some part x and 
"author of Waverly" as some other part, y • Now if there is an 
automorphism g in the group of the formal language such that g(x} = y 
then "Scott" and "author of Waverly" are indistinguishable by the 
the formal language under consideration. To say "Scott is the author 
of Waverly" is to assert that x and y are equivalent under the group 
of the form a l language and x may or may not be equal toy • Now 
suppose there is a phrase involving the word "Scott" corresponding 
to the semantic transformation T on the sequence of referents 
(x, z 1, •.. , zk) such that T(x, z 1, ••• , zk) = (w 1, ... , wn) • Then 
T(y, g{z 1 ), ••. , g(zk)) = (g(w 1 ), .•• , g(wn)). This shows that we 
can replace "Scott" by "author of Waverly" in the given phrase and 
the new phrase 1 s meaning is indistinguishable from the original 
phrase. 
Transformation Clo sure of~ Group 
The structure d etermined by a formal l anguage may also be 
characteriz ed by the collection of all semantic transformations 
invariant under the group of the formal l anguage . The semantic 
transformation closure of a group of automorphisms is the collection 
of all semantic transformations which co1nmute with every auto-
morphism in the group. The formal definition follows. 
Definition : LG is the sernantic transforma tion closure of G if LG is 
the collection of all sern.antic transformations, T , satisfying the 
follow ing prop e rty: for each pair of sequences of parts (x 1, ... , xn) 
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and (y1 , ••• , yk) such that 
then for each g in G we have 
If GF is the group of a formal language F then LGF includes 
every basic and derived semantic transformation of F when these 
transformations are considered to be restricted to definable parts. 
LGF may be thought of as the collection of all semantic transforma-
tions admissable under GF. While we c an think of LGF as 
constructible by infinite methods from F , LGF is not in general 
finit e ly constructible from F as the following argument shows. 
Given a group of automorphisms, G , conside r the collection of 
all parts in P which are fixe d under the action of G • These form a 
subalgebra of P , s ay B • Now consider all the functions from B to 
B • Each such function is admissable under G and so is a semantic 
transformation in LG , If B is infinite , then the collection of all 
functions from B to B is uncountable and hence so is LG , 
Roughly speaking, in LGF there is a sern.antic transformation 
from alrnost any sequence of defina ble parts into almost any other 
seque nce, Somewha t more precisely, LGF includes every potentia l, 
applicable semantic transformation, given the p articula r synonymi-
ties of the group G , In LGF we c an get to any d e finable p art from 
the referents of F • Can we get to any other parts by the application 
of sernantic transforma tions i n LGF which are not deriva ble from the 
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basic semantic transformations of F? In general the answer is y e s, 
however , in the next section, we d escrib e how F c an be strong enough 
so that everything definable by LGF is also definabl e by F • 
Definability 
Definition : Let F be a forma l l a n guage < T, K, X> • Then let DF 
be the collection of contextually definable p arts relative to the formal 
lang u age F • Let DLGF b e the collection of contextually definable 
parts relative to the class of referents X and the collection of 
sern.antic transformations LGF • 
Clearly D F i s a subclass of DLGF • We are interested in deter -
mining when DF = DLGF • Thi s requires considering t he topology of 
P. 
Theorem: Every automorphism of P is a horn.eomorphi sm when P is 
endowed with the metric topology i nduced by the measure µ • 
Proof : Let g be an automorphism of P • Suppose lim x. = p and 
1 
lim g (x .) t g (p ) • T hen lim (g (x .) - g (p)) = c t 0 • Hence for some 
1 1 
N and for all j > N, c rr (g (x .) - g(p)), 
J 
g- l (c} t 0 , c ontradicting lim x . = p • 
1 
points i n P , 
-1 
so that g (c) rr (x. - p) and 
J 
Thus g preserves all the limit 
If there is a sequence of parts x . i n DF such that lim x. = y , 
1 1 
t hen we say that DF has y as a limit point. If all the limit points of 
D F are in DF , t hen DF is closed. If y is a limit p o i nt of DF and g 
is any automorphism, then the image of DF under g possess es g (y ) 
as a limit point. So if DF has a limit point, there is a semantic 
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transformation in LGF from at least one definable part of DF to the 
limit point. For if lim x. = y , and every x. is in DF , then a 
1 1 
semantic transfonnation, T , defined only on the x . such that T(x.) = y 
1 1 
commutes with every g in G_. This shows that limit points of DF are 
in DLGF and suggests the following theorem. 
Theorem: If DF is closed in the measure topology, then DLGF is 
equal to the subalgebra generated by DF • 
Proof: Since DLGF properl y contains DF , there is a semantic 
transformation in LGF from a sequence of parts in DF to a sequence 
of parts in DLGF - DF • This in turn implies the existence of a 
s emantic transformation in LGF from a sequence of parts in DF to a 
single part in DLGF - DF • So suppose we have T(x1 , ••• , x ) = y . n 
where x 1 , ••• , xn are in DF and y is not in the subalgebra generated 
by DF • Then we will show that there is an automorphism, g , in 
GF such that x 1 , ••• , xn are fixed under g while g(y) I- y • This 
means that T is not a semantic transfonnation in LGF and y is not in 
DLGF. 
The proof is com plete d by conside ring the various possible 
Boolean algebraic relationships between y and the suba lgebra gener-
ated by DF. 
(i) y is disjoint from every x in DF . Then there are two 
subcases. First, y is the l a rgest p a rt disjoint from every x in DF. 
In this case y = ~ac and since DF is closed, ~ac is in DF and soy 
is in the subalgebra generated by DF. Second, y is not the comple-
ment of ~ac . Then there is some z such tha t y rr z and z is disjoint 
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from every x in DF • Consider the group of all automorphisms of 
the principal ideal generated by z • These automorphisms can be 
extended to automorphisms of P by considering them to act trivia lly 
on the parts of z . Since every x in DF is a part of z, these auto-
morphisms are the identity on every definabl e part, including 
x 1, ••• , xn • Furthermore, some of these automorphisms move y • 
Since these automorphisms fix the definable p a rts, this group is a 
subgroup of G • We have obtained a contradiction, which shows that 
if T(x 1 , ••• , xn) = y , then either y = ~ DF or y h as a part in common 
with some x in DF • 
(ii) Now if y is not covered by p arts in DF , then there is 
some part of y to which (i) applies. So we will assume that y is a 
p a rt of some x in the subalgebra generated by DF • Since y is, by 
assumption, not in the subalgebra generated by DF , it must be the 
case that some part of y is a proper part of an atom of the subalge-
bra, say z • Now con s ider the group of automorphisrn.s of (z ) as 
extended to automorphisms of P • The analysis in (i) applies to show 
that for some g in GF , y is moved whil e x 1 , •.• , xn are not. 
The fact that DF is closed has been used implicitly in the proof. 
For if DF were not clos e d, then limit points of DF would not be in 
th e algebra generated by DF although they are pr eserved by GF • 
Closures on Formal Languages 
With the above theorem in mind, we study two closur es on 
formal l anguages. 
The question of when DF = DLGF is of some importance if we 
-47-
feel that the essentially infinite processes, the undefinable semantic 
transformations, described as LGF , should be admitted as the 
completion of a formal language. That is, i f we speak a completely 
formal l anguage as described here, then our "intuition" roughly 
corre sponds to the undefinable transformations in LGF • If this 
seems reasonable, then for DF to equal DLGF means we have a 
l anguage powerful enough to formally define everything we c an 
"intuitively" define beginning with the synonymities and structure 
d escribed by G • 
As we show , a language is "intuitively" complete when every 
limit point of the definable parts is d etermined by a single semantic 
transformation. An example is the set of all integers considered as 
a limit determine d by the successor function. 
Given a formal language < T, K, X> over a model of part theory, 
P , we can always extend the formal language to include those 
semantic transformations which are invariant under every auto-
morphism of P • These semantic transforn1ations include p art 
theoretic union, inters ection, and complement, a selection function 
!;, , and all of the projection functions o~ . The selection function 
1 
s(x , y, z) is equal toy if x = 0 and is equal to z otherwise. The 
projection function o~ projects onto the ith component of a sequence 
1 
n 
of length n • o. (x1 , •.• , x } = x .• 1 n 1 
We d efine BF , where F = < T, K, X>, to be the collection of 
semantic transformations derivable from T together with the 
Boolean operations on P, s , and the 0::1. Because of the proj ection 
1 
functions, any part definable by BF from X is context-free definable. 
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If we considered only a finite number of projection fi.inctions , we 
could extend F to another forinal l anguage, F 1 , whose basic 
semantic transformations are those in T together with s , the finite 
collection of projection functions, and the Boolean operations on P • 
In either case the definable parts, DBF or DF 1 , are their own 
subalgebras. 
The second closure on a formal language involves an abstraction 
operator . The abstraction operator takes the conglomerate over 
semantic transformations rather than formulas. We then show that 
the semantic transformations derived from BF by abstraction are in 
LGF • In the follow ing development we write x g for g(x) and y for 
Theorem : If g is an automorphism of a model of part theory, th en 
P [F( z )] g = P [F(z)] 
z zg 
where F(z) i s a formula with z fr ee . 
Proof: Vd[dny- dgnyg] since g is an automorphism. Thus we 
have 
ygnP [F( z )] 
zg 
-Vd[dgnyg -3:z3:e (F (z) & egnzg & egndg)] & 3:f(ygrrf) 
-..Vd[dny -3:z3:e(F(z) & enz & end)] & 3:f(ynf) 
-ynP [F( z )]. 
z 
- ygnP [F(z)]g 
z 
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Th e orem: If F (z, y) is a formula of the lower predicate c alculu s 
Vfhose atomic formulas are of the form t 1 (x ) = t 2 (x) and t 1 , t 2 are 
semantic transformations, then 
P [ F ( z, y) ) = P [ T ( z, y) = 0 J 
z z 
where T(z, y) is a semantic transformation. 
Proof: (i} Any atomic formula t 1 (x) = t 2 (x ) c an be reduced to 
t 1 (x} ~ t 2 (x ) = 0 , where ~ denotes symmetric difference. 
t 1 (x) = o v t 2 (x) = o iff t 1 (x ) • t 2 (x ) = o • 
(iii) t(x ) f 0 iff P [ t(x) = 0 J = 0 , where z i s not free in t(x ). 
z 
(iv ) 3:y [ t (y , x ) = OJ i ff P [t(y, :X) =OJ f o y 
iff P [ P [t(y , x ) = OJ = OJ = 0, where z is not free in 
z y 
t(x ) • Note that here 3: means there is a part. 
T hus any formula i s reducible to T(x) = 0 for the appropriate T 
invol ving the o riginal semantic transformations of the formuJ.a, an d 
t he additional operations ~ , + , • , and P [ J • 
z 
We c an now d efine the abstraction of a semantic transforrn.ati on. 
Definition : If T(y, x) is a semantic transformation, define 
The following l emma shows that if T is in LG for some G , then 
so T , if it exists. q 
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Lemma: Let g be an automorphism of a model of part theory. If 
T(y, X) g = T(y g, xg) then T (x) g = T (xg) • q q 
Proof: Suppose T(y, x) g = T(y g, x g) • By the theorem above we 
have 
T (x) g = p [ T ( y, X) = q y 
and by definition, 
OJ g = p [ T(y, x) yg 
T (xg) = P [T(y, xg) =OJ • q y 
= oJ = P [ T(y g- 1, x) =OJ. y 
-1 - -If we can show that T(g y, x) = 0 -..T(y, g x) = 0 then T (x) g = q 
- -1 -T (xg). Recalling that xg = 0 - x = 0, we have T(y g , x) = 0 iff 
q . 
-1 - -1 - . -T(y g , x) g = 0 and T(y g , x) g = T(y, x g) , completing the proof. 
The following is an intuitive justification for considering the 
abstraction operation as a linguistic process. If y 1 , ••• , y n are 
definable parts such that T(y., x) = 0, we know the structure of 
1 
y 1 , ••. , y n in the context x as determined by the "formula" or 
semantic transforination T(y, x) = 0 • The intuition is that we know 
enough to abstract to that part which is the c:onglomerate of all p a rts, 
y , with the structure determined by T(y, x) = 0 , although all of these 
parts may not be d efin able. 
For example, if we know a f ew men, say John , Jack, and Joe, 
we can abstract to "man", without h a ving m.e t all men. While the 
extension of "man'' is presuma bly the class of all living men, the 
abstr a ction we obta in by conglom e rating i s somewhat closer to t he 
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intension of man, that is, the conglomerate of those entities with the 
structure of any man. Furthermore we can reach the abstraction 
"man" without having enumerated all men. 
It is reasonable to assume that formal languages of any strength 
include quantifiers and the sentential connectives . The sentential 
connectives correspond to the Boolean semantic transformations and 
the quantifiers correspond to the abstra ction operation, as illustrated 
in the following paragraph. 
Suppose , in a given formal language, we h ave a grammatical 
string of words, w 1 ••• wn , corresponding to the sequen ce of 
referents (x1 , •.• , xn). Further suppose that w 1 ••• wn is a logical 
sentence, either true or false, whos e truth value is determined by a 
semantic transformation T with value 0 just in c ase (x 1 , ... , xn) 
corresponds to a true s entence. T can be thought of as a characteris-
tic function on sequences of length n • We assurne t hat there is 
anoth e r such string wJ. ••• w~ with associated characteristic function 
T1 • Then 11w 1 ••• wn and wJ. ••• w~" is true just in case 
• 0. ' x' ) = 0 • m Cons ider the phrase "There is a 
w 1 such that w 1 ••• w n • " This is a true sentence just in case there 
is a p arty such that T(y, x 2 , ••• , xn) = 0 • Now 
3:y[T(y, x 2 , ••• , xn) =OJ if and only if Py[T(y, x 2 , ... , x11 ) =OJ I 0. 
We may r ewrite the l atter as T (x 2 , ... , x ) f 0 • This shows that q n 
quantification on the syntactic l evel corresponds to abstraction on 
th e semantic l evel. 
Th e clo sure BF of a formal l anguage F includes the Boolean 
semantic transformation s. To include the abstraction opera tion, and 
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thus the quantifiers, we define the abstraction closure of a formal 
language. 
Definition: If Fis a formal language, then PF is the smallest class 
including BF and, if T is in PF , then T is in PF • q 
Suppose for every limit point, y , of DPF there is a sequence x. 
l 
converging to y and the collection x. is exactly the image of some T 
1 
in PF • If each x. is part of y we have y :::: P Pix(T(x) :::: z)] and if y 
l z 
is part of each x. , y :::: P [VxVw(T(x ) :::: w - z • w :::: z)] • Thus DPF 
l z 
is closed. By the above l emma, the formulas inside P [ J can be 
z 
replaced by semantic transforinations. Under these conditions we 
have DPF :::: DLGF • If some other part theoretic relationship holds 
between the sequence x. and y , then this method of obtaining the 
l 
limit point by abstraction does not appear to work. In any case, if 
there is a limit point of DPF for which no sequence converging to it 
is definable by a finite nurn.ber of semantic transformations, then 
DPF is not clos ed. 
Galois Connection 
In developing th e Ga loi s connection [ 7 J between the groups of 
formal l anguages and the semantic transforination closures of the 
groups, we assuine that the formal l anguages all have the same 
coll ection of referents, X • If we have two formal l anguages 
F 1 :::: <T 1, K 1, X> and F 2 :::: <T2 , K 2 , X>, by the union of the two 
languages , F 1 + F 2 , we mean the formal lang uage 
< T 1 + T 2 , K 1 + K 2 , X > . CF d enotes the collection of all derived 
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semantic transformations of F • By the union· of two groups, 
G 1 + G2 , we mean the smallest group including both G 1 and G 2 • 
Since the proofs of the l emmas which establish the Galois connec -
tion are straight-forward, we use the following notation. By TE F we 
mean that T is a basic semantic transformation of F • By g T = T g , 
we mean that the semantic transformation T commutes with the auto-
morphism g in the manner used to define the group of a formal 
language. 
The first seven l emmas develop the Galois connection for 
arbitrary groups of automorphisms and their semantic transforma-
tion closures. 
Lemma 1: G E. GLG 
0 0 
Proof: g E G - \/TE LG ( g T = T g) - g E GLG • 
0 0 0 
Lemma 2: LGLG =LG 
0 0 
Proof: TE LG - VgE GLG (g T = T g ) - TE LGLG 
0 0 0 
TE LGLG VgE GLG (g T = T g) 
0 0 
v g E G ( g T = T g ) - TE LG 
0 0 
Lemma 3: G c G 1 - LG => LG1 o ·o 
Proof: Assume G
0 
.5:. G 1 • Then TE LG 1 - VgE G 1 (g T = T g) 
-VgEG(gT = Tg)-TELG. 
0 0 
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Proof: gE G 1 + G2 -- VTE LG 1 • LG2 (g T = T g) -- gE G(LG 1 • LG2 ) • 
Lemma 5: L(G1 + G2 ) = LG1 • LG2 • 
Proof: TEL(Gl + Gz) - VgEGl + Gz(gT = T g) 
-
TE LG 1 & TE LG2 - TE LG1 • LG2 
Lemma 6: LG(LG1 • LG2 ) = LG 1 • LG2 • 
Proof: Apply lemma 5, lemma 2, and then lemma 5 again. 
Lemma 7: L(G 1 • G2 ) ~ LG 1 + LG2 • 
Proof: TE LG 1 + LG2 - VgE G 1 • G 2 (g T = T g) - TE L(G 1 • G 2 ) • 
The remaining results complete the Galois connection for groups 
over formal langua ges and their semantic transforma tion closures. 
Lemma 8: GLGF = GF • 
Proof: Since we have l emma 1, it only rema ins to show that 
GLGF ~ GF • Suppose there is a gE GLGF not in GF • Then 
g does not commute with some sema ntic transformation in 
CF , and since Cc~ LGF , g does not commute with every 
semantic tra nsformation in GLGF , contradiction. 
Lemma 9: G(LGF 1 + LGF2 ) = GF 1 • GF2 • 
Proof: gE G(LGF l + LGF 2 ) 
- VTE LGF 1(gT = Tg) & VTE LGF2 (gT = Tg} 
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--gE GF 1 &gE GF2 _.. gE GF 1 • GF2 , 
Lemma 10: GF1 • GF2 = G(F1 + F 2 ) • 
Proof: gEGF1 ·GF2 - VTEF 1 (gT = Tg)& VTEF2 (gT = Tg) 
Lemmall: G(LGF 1 .LGF2 )cG(CF1 .cF2 ). 
Proof: gE G(LGF 1 • LGF 2 ) - VTE LGF 1 • LGF 2 (g T = T g) • 
Since CF c: LGF we have CF l • CF 2 c LGF l • LGF 2 • 
Thus gE G(LGFl. LGF2)- VTE CF1 • CF2 (gT = Tg)- gE G(CF 1 • CF2 ). 
Lemma 12: LGF I• LGF 2 c LG(CF l ·CF 2 ) • 
Proof: Apply lemmas 3 and 2 to the result of l emma 11. 
Proof: By lemma 12 we have 
gE G(CFl. CF2)- VTE LG(CFl. CF2)(gT = Tg) 
- v TE LG F 1 . LG F 2 ( g T = T g) 
- gE G(LGF l • LGF2 ) • 
Together with l emma 11, this proves the theorem, 
G(LGF l • LGF 2 ) 
= G(CF1 • CF2 ) 
GF1 
GF 1 •GF2 
=G(F1 +F2 ) 
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Diagram of the 
G a loi s Connection 
Between 
Formal L anguages 
and Thei1· 
LGF • LGF 1 2 
= LG(CF l ·CF 2 ) 
LGF 2 
L(GF • GF ) 1 2 . 
Semantic Transforma tion Closure. 
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V. SET THEORY 
In Chapter II we mentioned that the universe of discourse of a 
formal language can always be considered a model of set theory an d 
in Chapter IV we considered the universe of discourse a model of 
part theory. Of course we can always model part theory in set 
theory to obtain a set-theoretical universe of discourse for a formal 
language. Can we, for a given formal l anguage, find a submode! of 
an appropriate mode l of p art theory which is both a set theory and 
the universe of discourse of the l anguage ? This question is not 
trivia l since part theory is weaker than set theory and since we are 
looking for a set theory which can serve as the universe of discourse 
of a given l angu age. In this chapter we show that a set theory c an be 
imbedded in appropriate models of part theory. This imbedding is 
not arbitrary, but the con sequence of certain strong formal 
languages. Indeed one may say that the central result of this thesis 
is the fact tha t strong formal l anguages determine their own set 
theory, which is structurally determined by the formal l anguage and 
intimately connec ted with the part-whole relation . This is very 
differ ent from the r a ther ad hoc relationship between an '. 1outside" set 
theory and a rn.odel of part theory. 
Vve assume we h ave a semantic tr a nsforn1ation s which satisfies 
the following two prope rti es , where we write sx for s (x): 
(i) Vx3:z Vy (x /: y - z rr sx - sy ) , 
-58-
-(ii) Vx( sx rr 1) 
The first property guarantees that s is on e -to-one since there i s a 
part which distinguishes sx from sy for all y • This semantic trans -
formation is to be thought of as the singleton function of set theory, 
sx = [x}. s need only be defined on those p arts which are "sets", but 
we can also assume that s is defined on all of the model of part 
theory. If s is not everywhere defined, then property (i ) can be 
rewritten to hold only for those x such that sx is d efine d. We c an 
think of s as a predicate true of (x, y) iff sx = y • 
In order to develop the set theory, we require that the rn.odel of 
part theory, P , have the following property: 
If F(z) is any formula with z free over the predi-
cates rr and s , then P [F(z)] exists in P. 
z 
This is considerably stronger than the original axiom schema of 
part theory, although maintaining its flavor. In particular, the 
countable atomless Boolean algebra does not have the above property 
for any s • 
Now we can say that a part xis a set if it satisfies the following 
equation: 
x = P [z rr x & 3: y ( s y = z) J . z . 
This equation will b e denoted by S et (x) in the sequel. The equation 
guarantee s that xis a set just in case it is the least upper bound of 
all the singl e tons which are part of x. We define set membership as 
follows: 
x E: y - S et (y) & sx rr y • 
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We can now prove that the singleton p arts are sets. 
Lemma: Vx[Set(sx)] 
Proof: By property (ii) of s together with theorems 13 and 3 of part 
theory, sx 'TT P [z 'TT sx & 3:y(sy = z)] • It remains to show that 
z 
P [z 'TT sx & 3:y(sy = z)] 'TT sx. Suppose there is some 
z 
w 'TT P [z Tr sx & 3:y(sy = z) J such that w is disjoint from sx. But 
z 
since every p art of w must h a ve all of its parts in common with the 
various sy in the conglomerate, there is at l east one y, y {: x , such 
that sy 'TT P [z 'TT sx & 3:y(sy = z) J • However , every part of sy must 
z 
have a part in common with sx in orde r that sy be p a rt of 
P [z 'TT sx & 3:y(sy = z) J , so sy cannot satisfy property (i), and we 
z 
have obtained a contradiction. Hence 
sx=P[z'!Tsx &3:y(sy=z)]. 
z 
The following lemma shows that singleton sets have no sets as 
proper parts. 
Lemma : Vx[3:y(x 'TT sy & x {: sy) - -1 S e t(x ) J 
Proof: Assume 3:y(x 'TT sy & x {: sy) • We must show that 
x {: P [z 'TT x & 3:y(sy = z) J • First we note that since x 'TT sy , xis 
z 
not the zero of the part theory. Now suppose x is a set. Then every 
sing l eton set which is a part of xis a proper part of sy , contradict-
ing property (i) of s . 
We use the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiom system for set theory. We 
will show that those parts of P for which Set(x) holds satisfy the 
Zermelo-Fra enk e l axioms , except for regularity and choice. At that 
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point two alternatives are open to us. We can assume that the s 
function satisfies the axiom of regularity or we can develop a 
constructive theory of sets, in which the axiom of regularity can be 
proved. Not every part satisfying Set(x) is a constructive set, 
however. This latter approach has the advantage that Godel [ 12, 13 J 
has proved the axiom of choice for the constructive sets. Since 
Cohen [6 J has given a clear exposition of the constructive method for 
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, our presentation is formal, completing 
the details of Cohen's presentation. 
We can write a predicate of set theory which is true just in case 
its argument is constructive. With the aid of the imbedding to be 
presented, this predicate can also be written for part theory, and 
those parts which satisfy this predicate are the s e ts satisfying all the 
axioms of set theory, including regularity and choice. 
We turn to the prooof of the axioms of set theory within part 
theory. We recall that 
x E y - Set(y) & sx rr y • 
With the aid of this definition, we translate the axioms of set theory 
into statements of part theory for the proofs to follow. The order 
and presentation of the axioms of set theory follows Cohen [6]. 
1. Exten sionality 
VxVy [Set(x) & Set(y) - ( Vz[sz rr x - sz rr y] - x = y)] 
Proof: Suppose x and y are sets and that every singleton part of x is 
a part of y. We will show tha t Vz(z rr x - z rr y) • Cons ider any 
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z if x. Then since xis a set, we have z if P [z TI x & 3:w(sw = z)] 
z 
that is, Vd[d TI z -- 3:a3:e(a TI x & 3:w(sw = a) & e TI a & e TI d)] • 
Since every singleton part of x is a part of y we have z TI y • The 
same proof in th e othe r direction shows that x = y • 
2. Null Set 
3:x[Set (x ) & Vy( 1 sy if x)] 
Proof: 0 is a set which has no parts. Thus the zero of p art theory 
can be used as the null s et. 
3. Unordered Pairs 
VxVy[Set(x) & Set(y) -- 3:z(Set(z) & Vw[sw TI z - w = x Vw = y])] 
Proof: Given sets x an d y , consider z = sx + sy , where + is part 
theoretic union. By property (i) of s , th e only singleton sets which 
are part of z are sx and sy • Also, z is a set since it is the l east 
upper bound of sx and sy • 
4. Union 
vx[Set(x) -> 3:y(Set(y) & Vz[sz if y -- 3:t(Set(t) & sz TI t & st rrx)])] 
Proof: Consider y = Pt [st if x & Set(t) J . Suppose y is not a set. 
Then there is a c TI y such that c i s disjoint from each singleton set 
in y • Call this part c , But every part, d , of c must have a part 
0 0 
in common with some td such that std TI x & Set(td) • So c shares a 
0 
p art with some singleton part oft , hence of y , This contradiction 
shows that y is a set, Now, if we have sorne t and z such that 
S et (t) & sz if t & st TI x , we have sz TI y • For the reverse implica-
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tion let sz be some singleton part of y for which it is not the case 
that 3:t(Set(t) & sz 1T t & st 1T x) • We will use property (i) of s to 
derive a contradiction. By property (i) there is a part of sz , say w , 
which has no part in common with any other singleton set. But every 
part d of w must have a part in common with some td such that 
std 1T x & Set(td). Hence w shares a part with some singleton part of 
some t , contradiction. Thus if sz 1T y then 
3."t( set(t) & sz 1T t & st 1T x) , completing the proof of the union axiom. 
Note that Set(t) in Pt[st 1T x & Set(t)] c an be r ewritten as 
[Vd[d 1T t - 3:a3:e(F(a) & err a & e 1T d)] & t rr 1] 
&[(Vd[d rr c - 3:a3:e(F(a) & err a & err d)] & c rr 1) - c rr t] 
where 
F(a) - a 1T t & 3."w(sw = a) 
which shows that Set(t) is a formula over rr and s alone, and so we 
have guaranteed the existence of Pt [st rr x & Set(t) J • 
5. Infinity 
3."x[Set(x) & sO rr x &Vy(sy 1T x - s(y + sy) rr x)] 
Proof: Let st (x ) be the following formula of part theory: 
sO rr x &Vy (sy rr x - s(y + sy) 1T x ). 
L et w = P [st (z ) & Vx (st (x) - z rr x ) J . Clearly w satisfies st and so it 
z 
s atisfies the axiom of infinity i f it is a set. If w is not a set then 
there is some c 1T w such that c is disjoint fr01n every singleton set in 
w. In this case w' = w - c satisfies st , and since w satisfies st we 
h ave w 'IT w - c , showing tha t c = 0 , contradicting c 'IT w . So we h ave 
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Set(w) • 
6 • Replacement 
n 
To state the axiom of replacement, we enumerate the formu-
las of part theory over rr and s with at least two free variables, 
An (x, y; t 1 , ••• , \:) where k depends on n • We may think of the 
t 1 , ... , tk as parameters of the formula An • The axiom of replace-
ment then reads 
vt1 ... \:[Vx(Set(x)-<3:!y[Set(y) &An(x,y;t 1 , ••• , \:)])- Vz3:wB(z,w)] 
where 
B (z, w) - [Set(z) - Set(w) & Vr(sr rr w -
3:q[Set(q) & sq rr z & An(q, r; t 1 , ••• , \:)])] • 
Fixing t 1 , ••• , \: , if An (x, y) determines y uniquely for each set 
x, y = f(x) , then the range off, when f is restricted to the set z , is 
a set, 
Proof: Suppose it is the case that Vx(Set(x) - 3:! y[Set(y) & A (x, y)]) 
n 
where we assume t 1 , ,,, , \:are fixed and so have dropped them from 
our formal presentation, To show that Vz 3:w B(z, w) , let z be any 
part satisfying Set (z) , D efine 
w = P [3:b(sb = a & 3:q[Set(q) & sq rr z & A (q, b)]).] , 
a n 
w is a set sinc e it is a conglomerate of singletons, Furthermore we 
have 
Vr(s r rr w - 3:q[Set(q) & sq rr z & A (q, r)]) 
n 
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since if sr 'IT w then by the definition of w we have 
3:q[Set(q} & sq 'IT z & A (q, r}] while if we are given an r such that 
n 
3:q[Set(q} & sq 'IT z & A (q, r)] then sr 'IT w, again by the definition of 
n 
w • Hence the aximn of replacement holds. 
7. Power Set 
We define the subset relation by 
zs::.x-Vw(SW'ITZ-SW'ITX}. 
Then the statement of the power set axiom we prove here is 
Vx3:yVz[sz'!Ty-zcx]. 
This version of the power set axiom is much stronger than is requir-
ed to show that the power set of every set exists. For we have here 
that the power parts of every part, set or not, are parts. As the 
proof indicates, the smallest power part is a set so that the power 
set axiom holds when it is restricted to those parts satisfying Set(x) 
Proof: Given a part x, consider y ~ P [3:b(sb =a & b c x}] • Since 
a 
y is a conglomerate of singletons, we have Set(y) , whether x is a set 
or not. Clearly if z is a subset of x then sz 'IT y • Now consider any 
~inglb;ton which is a part of y • Since the singletons are unique func-
tions of their arguments by property (i) , any singleton part of y must 
satisfy the formula d e fining y • Hence y is exactly the power set of 
x. 
8. Axiom of Regularity 
Vx[Set(x} & x-/: 0 - 3:y(Set(y) & sy rr x & Vz [sz 'IT x - 1 sz 'IT y ])] 
P a rts satisfying t h is axiom a re 's a id to b e well-founded. As w a s 
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remarked earlier, the singleton function s has not been restricted 
enough to prove the axiom of regularity. However, with the seven 
axioms we have proved, it is possible to consider just the construc-
tive sets, for which the axiom of regularity can be proved. 
Constructive Set Theory 
In order to describe the constructive set theory, we define the 
ordinals of the model of set theory. 
Definition: A part x is transitive if 
sz 1T y & sy 1T x - sz rr x • 
Definition: A part xis well-ordered by E if E orders x and if y rr x 
and y is a set then 3:z[zE y & Vw(w E y - 1 w E z)], where 
a E b - Set(b) & sa rr b • 
Definition: A part a is an ordinal if a is a set well-ordered by E and 
a is transitive. 
Next we will define an ordinal sequence of sets which contain all 
the constructible sets. We will require a method which given a set, 
X , obtains the set, X' , of all sets constructible from X • 
Definition: Let X be a set. We define the set X' by forming the union 
of X and the set of all sets y defined by a formula restricted to X • 
That is, conside r any formula ove r rr and s with at least on e free 
variable, 
A(z; t 1, ••• , ~F • 
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Then let AX(z; t 1 , ••• , 1'_) be the formula A with all bound variables 
restrict e d to sets in X. Let x 1, ••• , ~be fixed sets in X, and 
define 
Now let Y = Psy [ if A{z; t 1, ••• , 1k) is a formula over TI and s then 
y = Psz[sz TIX & AX(z; x 1, ••• , ~FzzI and let X' = X+Y. 
This d efinition still requires a complete formaliz a tion. This is 
done by d e finin g a single formula B(X, z) which is satisfied just in 
case z = X' • We return to this after completing the presentation of 
constructive set theory. 
Definition: If QI is an ordina l l arge r than 0 , d efine M = ( L- M )' , 
QI 13<QI 13 
where the union is set theoretic. I; Ml3 is guaranteed to exist by the 
13 <QI 
replacement and union axioms. D efine M = 0 • 
0 
Definition : A s et x is con s tructibl e if there exists an ordinal, QI , 
such that x E M 
QI 
It only r emains to show that the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms hold 
for the constructible sets. Since thi s is done in Cohen [6, p. 89 ], 
we do not repeat the proofs here. The only axiom we must inde pend-
ently check is t he axiom of infinity since Cohen 's proof appears to 
requir e the axiom of r egul arity. Sinc e in our proof of the axiom of 
infinity we demonstrated the set of all integers, w , we only need to 
note that w i s an ordinal and that w E Mw+ 1 , to show that w is 
constructible. 
We turn to formalizing the relation Y = X' . For each r ~ 0 l et 
-67-
X denote the set of all sets S of sequences of length n, 
r 
(x1 , •.• , xn) , for which there is a formula 
A(x1 , ••• , xn; t 1 , ••• , tm) with exactly r quantifiers and yi E X such 
that 
Then X' is the set of all sequences of length 1 which are in any X 
r 
We show that the relation Y = X is expressible in part theory 
. r 
with s • The relation Y = X is expressed by d efining the sets S 
0 
which arise from the quantifier-free formulas by induction on the 
l ength of the formula. The following formulas are used in defining 
the relation Y = X The notation here is that <x, y> is the ordered 
0 
pair composed of x and y and <x, y, z> = <x, <y , z>> • 
H 1 (X, Y) - Vx(x E Y -
3:y[y E Y &Vz(z E y-3:u3:v(z = <u, v> &v Ex &u EX)) 
&VuVv3:z(u EX & v Ex- z = <u, v> & z E y)]) 
H 2 (X, Y) - Vx(x E Y - Vt(t E X -
3:y[y E Y &Vz 3:u3:v(z E y- u Et &v Ex & z = <u, v>) 
&VuVv3:z(u Et &v Ex- z = <u, v> &z E y)])) 
H3( X , Y) - Vx(x E y - ·vt (t E x -
3:y [y E Y & V z 3:u 3:v(z E y - t E u & u E X & v E x & z = <u, v> ) 
&VuVv3:z(t Eu &u E X&v Ex- z = <u, v> &z E y)])) 
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H4 (X, Y) - Vx(x E Y -
3:y[y E y & Vz3:u3:v3:w(z Ey - u EV & u Ex & v Ex & w EX & z=<u, v, w>) 
& Vu Vv Vw 3:z(u Ev & u EX & v EX & w Ex - z=<u, v, w> & z Ey) ]} 
conjunction: 
Jl(X, Y) -vxVy(x E y &y E y - X•y E Y) 
negation: 
J z ( X, Y} - V x Vy ( x E Y & y E Y -+- x - y E Y) 
rearrangement: 
11 (X, Y) - Vx(x E Y & Vz 3:u3:v(z E x - z = <u, v> & u € X & vE X) -
3:y[y E Y & Vz3:u3:v(z E y - z = <v, u> & <u, v> E x) 
& Vu Vv 3:z(<u, v> E x - z = <v, u> & z E y)]) 
I2 (X, Y) - Vx(x E Y & Vz3:u3:v3:w(z Ex - z = <u, v, w> & uEX & vEX)-
3:y[y E Y & Vz3:u3:v3:w(z E y - z = <v, u, w> & <u, v, w> E x) 
& Vu Vv Vw 3:z(<u, v, w> E x -z = <v, u, w> & z E y)]) 
terminal elements: 
G 1 (X, Y) - XE Y 
G 3 (X , Y} - Vt(t E X - 3:y[y E Y & Vz (z E y - t E z & z E X)]) 
G4 (X, Y} - Vx(xEX &Vz3:u3:v(zE x-- z=<u,v> &uEX &vEX} --
3:y-[y E Y & Vz3:u3:v(z E y-u Ev &z Ex &z = <u, v>)]} 
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We now define the formula Q (X, Y) which is true if and only if 
0 
Y .2 X where X denotes the set of all s ets S of n-tuples 
0 0 
<x1, ... , xn> for which there is a quantifier-free formula 
••• J t ) and there are y. EX such that 
m i 
Q (X, 
0 
Y) - .. G 1 (X, Y) & G 2 (X, Y) & G 3 (X, Y) & G4 (X, Y) 
& H 1 (X, Y) & H2 (X, Y) & H 3 (X, Y) & H4 (X, Y) 
& 11 (X, Y) & 12 (X, Y) 
& J 1 (X, Y)& J2 (X, Y) . 
The following theorem shows that there i s a formula of part 
theory over the predicates 1T ands which expresses the relation 
Y=X 
0 
Theorem: X = P [Q (X, z) & Vx(Q (X, x ) - z 1T x ) J . 
0 z 0 0 
Proof: By induction o n the length of the formulas. 
1. Atomic formulas: 
i) xi E yj . This case is handled by G 2 and H 2 , together 
H 1 which is required in "build up'
1 to the i + -1 ~ pla ce from the nth 
place and then from the i - 1 ~ pla c e to th e first pla ce, G 1 is requir-
ed to start constructing the dir e ct product. 
ii) y. E x .• This case is handled by G3 and H 3 . J l 
iii) x. EX., This cas e is handl e d by G4 and H 4 togethe r l J 
with 11 and 12 to allow rearrangement of the n-tuples so that we can 
have i different from j + 1 • 
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iv) y. E y .• Trivial since this formula is either true or 
1 ~ 
false, so adds no new n-tuples, 
2. Induction: 
i) If we have 
and 
• 0 0 ' 
x > 
n I A(xl' ••• ' x· n' 
x·y n' l' •••• 
then 
then 
SA•SB = [<x1, ••• , xn> I A( ••• ) &B ( ••• )} 
This is the purpose of J 1 • 
ii) If we have 
... ' x > n A( ••• )} 
This is the purpose of J 2 • Since every element of an n-tuple is 
restricted to X , if we remove from the direct product, X x • •• x X , 
-----------
n - times 
then-tuples corresponding to A , we have the set of 
n-tupl es corresponding to 1 A 
It remains to show tha t 
P[Q(X, z}&Vx(Q(X, x)-znx)]CX. 
z 0 0 0 
Clearly every element of P [ ••. J is a set of n-tupl es , each n-tupl e of 
z 
-71-
which is over X. Since P [ •.• J is the smallest set satisfying 
z 
Q {X , Y) , every element of P [ ••• J has been generated by on e of 
0 z 
the G, H, I, J ''processes" defined above, and each process corre-
sponds to a "construction" of the lower predicate calculus over E • 
Hence each element of P [ ••• J corresponds to some quantifier-free 
z 
formula restricted to X. 
We now define Xr+l in terms of Xr This definition corresponds 
to adding one quantifier, 3: or V, to the formulas defining the 
n-tuples in X , where the range of the quantifier is restricted to X • 
r 
- 3:t [Set(t) & (tE X - Vz [z Ex - 3:w(wE X & <w, z> E t) ]) J 
r 
V 3:t [Set(t) & (tE X 
r 
Vz[zEx- Vw(wEX- <w,z>E t)J)J. 
Finally, we can define X 1 in terms of X formally by: 
X 1 = X + P [Set(z) & (x Ez - xEX) & 3:r(rEUJ & zEX )] • 
sz r 
This completes our imbedding of set theory in a model of part 
theory. 
Set Theories rnde r~ Forma l Language 
W _e have developed some of the consequences of assuming that a 
formal languag e has a model of p a rt theory as its universe of 
discourse. In particular , a forma l language is chara cterized, albeit 
impe rfectly, by the group of automorphisms which leave the language 
invariant. We also h ave shown that if the model of part th eory has a 
strong property then we can imbed a set theory in the collection of 
parts. In this section we discuss the r e l ationship between the group 
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of a formal language and models of set theory. Assuming that the 
universe of discourse is strong enough to support a set theory, we 
would like to show that we can always find a set theory within the 
parts such that the formal language c an be construed to have the 
collection of sets as its universe of discourse. That is, for all parts 
x definable by the formal language, x satisfies Set(x} , given some 
fixed singleton function. 
The simplest case is when the formal languag e F has such a 
singleton function as one of its basic semantic transformations. 
Then GF fixes every part x which satisfies Set(x) and which is well-
founded, since a model of set theory has no proper automorphisms. 
It is worth noting that GF itself is larger than the identity automorph-
ism since there are prope r parts of each singleton which can be 
permuted among themselves without affecting the sets. 
We digre ss to reconside r what property a model of part theory 
must possess to obtain a set theory. The existence of the 
conglomerate of every formula over 1T an d s is certainly stronger 
than is requir e d, since we ne e d only use 1T in orde r to define E • 
With the help of property (ii) of s we can show that sx 1T y if and only 
if sx. y = sx • R ecalling the r esults of the previous chapter on the 
relationship between formulas and abstraction, we se e that it is 
sufficient, for the imbedding of a set theory, to insist upon the 
existence of the abstraction of every semantic transformation in a 
forma l l anguage with a singleton function and the Boolean functions . 
Lernma : sx 1T y - S X• y = sx 
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Proof: By axiom 2 of part theory, sx 1T y - Vz(z 1T sx - z 1T y) So 
using theorem 19, Vz(z 1T SX _.. Z 1T SX•y). By theorem 28, 
Vz(z 1T sx • y - z 1T sx) • Combining the last two formulas and using 
axiom 1 we have sx 1T y - sx. y = sx. Now assume sx. y = sx. By 
a xiom 1, Vz(z 1T s x - z 1T s x • y) • Combining these with property 
(ii) of s and applying axiom 2 we have s x 1T y • 
To return to the discussion of set theories under formal 
languages, suppose F is such that GF has an i nfini te number of 
fixed points which form an atomic subalgebra of the algebra of p arts. 
Then since the Skolem-Lowenheim theorem guarantees that there is 
a countable model of set theory, LGF contains a singleton function 
d efined on the fixed points of GF and the singleton function defines a 
set theory. 
Even i f the fixed points of GF do not form an infinite atomic 
suba l gebra, we can find a set theory under F • There is a subgroup, 
N , of GF which fixes every part definable by F • If F defines an 
infinite number of parts which generate an atomic subalgebra then 
LN contains a singleton function. Further, every part definable by 
F satisfies Set (x ) • N is a normal subgroup_ of GF , as we show 
below. The factor group GF /N can be thought of as the automorph-
isms of the sets which leave F inva riant. If GF /N is larger than the 
identity then the singleton function i s not invariant unde r GF /N and F 
i s not strong enough to define a set theory. For example, suppose 
the only basic semantic transformation in Fis List(x) = [ [y} \ y c x} 
where c i s defin e d by a particular singleton function in LN • Then 
GF /N conta ins, among others, the automorphism which permutes 
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[k2 }k and [k3 }k for all k ::::: 1 where [ 1x }1 = [x} and 
rk+lx}k+l = [k[x} }k. 
The subalgebra generated by the definable parts may contain 
non-atomic parts. The only way to include the non-atomic parts in 
the set theory is to widen the definition of the predicate "Set" to 
include individuals and consider the non-atomic parts to be individuals 
of the set theory. 
If the formla language F defines only a finite number of p a rts we 
can still find a set theory under F • For each atom x of the algebra 
of definable parts we can choose an infinite number of proper parts of 
x which form an atomic Boolean algebra when relativized to x • Then 
GF has a normal subgroup, N , which fixes the chosen algebras and 
LN has a set theory defining singleton function. In this set theory 
each part definable by F is an infinite set. This is not pleasing to the 
intuition , for one feels that if ther e are only a finite number of 
d efinable p a rts then the formal language ought to be discus sing the 
interr e lations among a few finite sets, rathe r than infinite sets. If 
the part theo retic union, y , of the d e finabl e parts does not reach the 
univers a l part, 1 , then the intuition c an be s atisfied by developing 
the set theory within the complement of y, using the algebra of the 
definable parts as some of the finite sets. 
We turn now to the proof that the subgroup N of GF is normal in 
GF, for any formal l anguage F whose definable parts generate an 
atomic subalgebra. 
Given a group G , which is a group over a formal languag e, and 
the coll e ction , X , of p a rts contextu a lly d e finable by the formal 
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language, we obta in the collection of G-definable parts by taking the 
set-theoretic union of the orbits under G of every x in X • That is, 
if xis definable, then g(x) is G-definable for every g in G . Let B 
be the sub-Boolean algebra (submode! of part theory) generated by 
the G-definable parts. 
Now consider the largest subgroup, N , of G which leaves every. 
part in B fixed. To show that N is normal in G , we prove some 
lemmas. 
Lemma: If xis in B , then for all g in G , g(x) is in B • 
Proof: Let x be in the subalgebra B . Then x is the Boolean union, 
intersection or complement of G-definabl e parts. Hence g(x) is also 
a Boolean combination of G-definable parts. Thus g(x) is in B. 
Lemma: If x is an atom of B , then for all g in G , g(x) is an atom of 
B. 
Proof: Suppose x is an atom of B and for some g in G , g(x) is not an 
atom of B. Sinc e g(x) is in B , g(x) possesses a prope r part which 
is in B , say z • But then g -l (z) is a proper p a rt of x which is i n B , 
contradiction. 
Notation: G restricte d to x , GI x , is the collection of all auto-
morphisms in G with the dom ain of each automorphism restricte d to 
th e parts of x . 
Lemma: If x is an atom of B , then 
N! x= Glx = A(x) 
where A (x ) is the full g r oup of automorphisms of the p r in cipa l ideal 
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generated by x • 
Proof: Since G is a group over a formal language, it is the largest 
group satisfying the commuting property on the definable parts. 
Since no proper part of x is definable, G \ x is A(x} • N \ x = G \x 
since N is, by definition, the largest subgroup of G leaving B fixed. 
In the following lemma and theorem the automorphisms act on the 
right, so that xg is the value of g when applied to x • 
Lemma: If x is an atom of B , then 
[ -1 Vg in G Vn in N 3:m in N Vzrrx zgng = xm] • 
Proof: Consider any gin G, n in N, and suppose xg = y. We can 
consider any g in G taking x toy , when restricted to x , as the 
product of two maps. The first is a "tran s l ation" d epending only on 
x and y , i , and the second some p in A(y} • That is, g \ x = i p • 
ry g ryg 
Thus 
-1 gng 1 
xy 
-1 
where n is considered to be restricted to y , and g is considered to 
-1 be restricted to x • Now p n p is an element of A(y} , s a y m' , and g g 
i m 1 i -l is an element of A(x) , say m • So we h ave 
xy ry 
g n g-l Ix= m Ix which proves th e l emma. 
Theorem: If B is atomic then N is normal in G . 
Proof : Since all automorphi sn~s preserve l east upper bounds we have 
x = I: x if and only if xg = I: x g for every x in the model and every g 
a a 
in G • For every x in the model, we c an write x = ~ x where each 
a 
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x is a part of an atom of B 
ct 
If we consider N to be restricted to 
the parts of the atoms, a 
ct 
of B , then N is the direct product 
since N fixes a and is unrestricted on the proper parts of a • Now 
ct ct 
consider n in N where N is thought of as acting on the full model. 
Then xn 
x n TT a 
ct ct 
= L x n where, if a is the atom of B 
ct ct 
such that x rra , then 
ct ct 
-1 For any g in G we h ave xg n g -1 = L x g n g and by the 
ct 
previous lemma, for each ct there is an m in A(a } such that 
ct ct 
xgng-l = LX m • Since N is the direct product of the full auto-
ct ct 
morphism groups A(a } , there is an m in N such that m I a = m 
ct ct ct 
-1 hence g n g = m in N • 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Formal Language Definitions 
We defined, following Thompson [ 32 ], a general notion of formal 
language which includes the current notions of syntax, where we 
considered the syntactic elements of the language to arise from a 
functiona lly oriented sernantic system. The syntax of a formal 
language is in general a Post production system and we mentioned 
that, in this formulation, c e rtain strings may be syntactically 
correct but not meaningful because of semantic con siderations. The 
sern.antic considerations have been formalized by allowing a semantic 
transformation to be defined on a subdirect product of semantic 
categories , that is, only on tho se elements of a dir ect product of 
semantic category satisfying certain constraints. If these 
constraints can be d escribe d using syntactic notions alone, then they 
may be considered structural constraints and the notions of transfor-
:r;natio!lal grammar [ 4, 5 J may apply. However, some further study 
will be required before the relationship between form.al languages 
and transformational grammars is completely understood. 
Groups 
By considering a formal l anguage to have a model of part theory 
as its universe of discourse we can consider the formal language to 
be characterized by a group of automorphisms of the model. Since 
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the groups are partially ordered by inclus ion, we can preorder the 
forma l languages by defining F 1 ~ F 2 whenever GF 1 ~ GF 2 • The 
relation on formal l angu ages is a preordering since two formal 
languages may be associated with the same group as the following 
example illustrates. 
We d efine two formal l anguages over the same model of set 
theory which we may consider as imbedded in a given model of p art 
theory. F 1 has as it s sole semantic transformation a cha racteristic 
function defined on sets. Char{x) = [O} if x -/:. 0 and Char {O) = 0 • 
The sole semantic category of F 1 is the class of all sets and the 
class of referents of F 1 is any finit e coll ection of sets which includes 
0 and [O} • F 2 has as its sole semantic transformation a slightly 
differ ent characteristic function on sets. Empty{x ) = [O} if 0 f. x 
and Empty{x) = 0 if 0 E x , where E is the membership r e lation for 
the model of set theory. GF 1 is gene r ated by all permutations of the 
singleton sets which l eave [O} fixed, since a ll automorphisms of a 
Boolean algebra fix 0 and if x-/:. 0 , then xg -/:. 0 and Char{xg) = [O} 
which implies g{ [O}) = [O} • Since every set c an be expressed as a 
union of singletons, we see that GF 1 is as stated. The semantic 
transformation Empty has the special property that [O} i s in its 
rang e and 0 E x if and only i f [O} is a subset of x. This implies 
that any automorphism in GF 2 must leave [ 0} fixed, and if g is any 
auromorphism with this property, then 0 E x iff 0 E xg so we have 
Empty{xg) = Empty(x) • Thus GF l = GF 2 • 
A possible method of avoiding this difficulty is to consider the 
s emigroup of endomorphisrns which l eave a given language invariant. 
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The lemmas establishing the nature of the Galois conn e ction between 
GF and LGF also hold if endomorphisms are considered rather tha n 
automorphisms, so that these results are available, but further study 
is required to determine if each formal language uniquely determines 
a semigroup of endomorphisms. 
The Galois connection between GF and LGF suggests that each 
p air of languages possesses an upper bound and a lower bound 
l anguage. By an upper bound language for F 1 and F 2 we mean a 
l anguage which c a n express anything expressible in F 1 and in F 2 • 
F 1 + F 2 , as defined in the section on the Galois connection, is such 
an upper bound language , although not necessarily a l ea st upper 
bound. By a lower bound language for F 1 and F 2 we rn.ean a l a nguage 
in which the only entities d efinable are also d efinable in F 1 and in F 2 • 
If it is possible to find a finite collection of b asic semantic transfor-
mations, T , such that CT c CF 1 • CF 2 , then from T we c an form a 
lower bound l anguage . If CT = CF 1 • CF 2 then from T we can form a 
"greatest " lowe r bound l angu a ge. T may not be unique, however, 
which implies that there is not, in general, a unique greatest lower 
bound. As an example, if GF 1 •CF2 is the collection of all Boolean 
functions , then as b as ic semantic transformations for T we can take 
inte rsection an d complement, or th e Boolean ring sum and product. 
Thes e cons iderations suggest studying the conditions under which 
t w o formal l anguages have reasonably unique l east upper bound and 
greate st lower bound l anguages . Further , t he G a loi s conne ction 
b ecomes cons iderabl y more difficult to analyze if F 1 and F 2 do not 
po ssess the san1e coll ection of refer ents . This analysis will be 
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carried out and it may indicate the conditions under which least 
upper bound and greatest lower bound languages exist. One result 
that we do have that will be useful in studying least upper bound 
languages is that every pair of formal languages has a common set 
theory underlying them. The sets are the elements of the subalgebra 
generated by the parts definable in either language. 
Another problem suggested by the many-one correspondence 
between formal languages and their groups, and also by the nature of 
the Galois connection, is determining the class of formal languages 
which are associated with a given group of automorphisms . At 
present, no work has been done on this problem. 
Part Theory, S e t Theory 
The relatively weak ontology of assuming the universe to be part 
theoretic has enabled us to consider automorphisms of the model of 
part theory as the changes t aking place in the world, and character-
ize the structure which the formal l anguage discusses as a group of 
autom orphisms , If the model of part theory is strong enough, for 
example a complete Boolean algebra, then a model of set theory is 
imbeddable in the mode l of part theory. At the same time, we have 
avoided assuming that th.e world is atomistic and in fact have implic-
itly assumed throughout Chapte rs IV and V that it is atomless, The 
fact that we c an imbe d a set theory implies that any particular 
atomic view of the universe c an be accommoda t e d, There r emains 
the question, however , of the relationship between a non-atomic 
suba l gebra of parts defined by a formal l anguage and a set theory 
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imbedded in the model of part theory. If there is room in the model 
for both the non-atomic subalgebra of parts and a s e t theory, then, 
letting N be the group of the set theory, LN will con tain a function, 
f , from the non-atomic definable parts to the s ets such that if 
x 1T y then f(x) c f(y). Then in LN we should be able to discuss these 
parts as if they were l arge s ets . The exact situation here remains 
unclear. 
The view of a set theory as a particular collection of parts may 
have value in the theory of sets itself. Cohen, in discus sing models 
of set theory in which the axiom of choice fails, points out that a 
standa rd model of set theory h as no proper automorphisms, but that 
"the basic idea of h aving some kind of symmetry remains . " 
[ 6, p. 136 ]. The collection of parts fixed by a group N can, if it 
is large enough, be thought of as a set theory determined by a 
particular singleton function in LN • There are many such singleton 
functions in LN and it may be possible to cons ider Cohen 's "forcing" 
as a method of s electing among these functions. 
Another aspect of the relationship between a formal language and 
a set theory beneath it we wish to determine is when it is possible to 
find a set theory such that every basic semantic transformation of the 
formal language i s recursively definable in terms of the operations of 
the set theory, as discussed in Chapter II. This result should be 
suggestiv e of the adequacy of a model of part theory as the sole 
universe of discourse for formal l anguages. When it is pos sible to 
find a set theory for which th e formal language is recursively 
definable, any objections fro n1 the constructivists are met since the 
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semantic transformations are effectively computable in terms of 
intuitively satisfying primitive operations. 
Sentences 
In Chapter II we indicated that the position of sentences as a 
subclass of the phrases of a language is unclear. We can a priori 
distinguish sentences by syntactic means, but this leaves open the 
question of why those particular phrases are distinguished from the 
remaining ones. It may be possible to consider sentences as distin-
guished by an algebraic property based on the universe of discourse. 
For example, it may be that certain systems of endomorphisms 
leave invariant the structure which the intuition says is associated 
with sentences but not with phrases of the language. Here the first 
step is to state the problem more clearly than we have been able to 
do. 
Transformations of Qualities 
We return to the problem posed by the red pencil burning into 
black soot. Suppose we have a formal language in which "The red 
pencil burns into black soot." is a sentence; corresponding to some 
derived semantic transformation. In this l anguage "the red pencil" 
corresponds to some p a rt x and "black soot" to some part y • The 
change describe d in the formal language by "the red pencil burns into 
black soot. '' is an automorphism, g , such that g(x) = y • This auto-
morphism is not in the group of the formal language since the red 
pencil and the black soot, x and y , are distingui shabl e. If x and y 
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are atoms of the subalgebra of definable parts, then there is no 
"red" part of x or "black" part of y as far as this formal l anguage is 
conc erned since x and y are structureless. Any automorphism 
taking x toy is an equally valid change irrespective of how the auto-
morphism takes proper parts of x into proper parts of y • In this 
formal language , there is no red part to be transformed. 
Suppose x and y are not atoms, x h a ving a red part and y having 
a black one. The automorphism taking x to y need not preserve the 
structur e of x since it is not in the group of the form a l language , and 
so there is no requirement for the red part of x to map into any 
particular part of y • The distinguishability of x and y imply that the 
transformation of x into y is a change obse rvable by a spea ker of the 
given formal language . A change is observable because of the change 
in structure, where the structure is d ete rmined by the language. 
The sentence "The red pencil burns into black soot. " d enotes that the 
entity with the structure of a r e d pencil has been transformed into an 
entity with the structur e of black soot without specifying the transfor-
mation of substructures like the r e d p art of the red p encil. We can, 
if we like, consider the red p art of x to be transformed into the black 
p art of y since this preserves some structure ass ociate d with color. 
If we have a much mor e d etailed formal l anguage in which we can 
discuss th e intera ction of molecules and light, there is a sentence 
which explains the transformation of sensual red into sensual black in 
a way that preserves far more structure than our original sentence . 
Even here, however , the entire structure is not pr eserve d since the 
c hange i s observable. 
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This discussion has served to illustrate that in relation to a fixe d 
formal language ther e is no difficulty associated with the transforma-
tion of the qualities of a part when the part is transformed, Either 
the entire structure of the part is preserved, in which case the part 
and its transform are indistinguishable by the formal language, or the 
entire structure is not preserved and the transform of a part is 
distinguishabl e from the part itself, 
Groups as Function Spaces 
We would like to formalize the intuitive notion of the distance 
betwe en forma l languages , There appears to be some possibility of 
doing so along the following lines , 
Given a model of p a rt theory, P , together with a measure µ on 
P , we can cons ider any group of automorphisms as a function space 
by d efining, for any two automorphisms g and h , 
d ':' [ g, h] = sup d[ xg, xh] 
where d is the metric defined by µ , 
If each automorphism in a group G is uniformly continuous as a 
J:iome?morphism of P , then G is a topolog ical group, as we prove 
below, G, Birkhoff [ l, p. 169] d escribes a complete measure 
algebra, M , unique up to i sometr ic isomorphism, which is obviously 
a model of part theory, Since M is metrically complete, it is 
comple te as a metric spa ce, Furthermore, M is totally bounded so 
M is compa ct [ 16, p . 84 J and thus every automorphism of M is 
uniform ly continuous [ 16, p. 30 J. If F is a formal language w ith M 
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as its universe of discourse, GF is a toplogical group. The conse-
quences of this fact may have interesting implications for the study 
of formal languages. In particular, it enhances the prospects for 
finding an intuitively reason_able metric topology on the lattice of 
groups of formal languages. If this can be done, then we can define 
the psuedo-distance between two formal languages as the distance 
between their associated groups. There remains, of course, the 
difficulty that two distinct formal l anguage s may share the same 
group, so that the collection of formal languages is, under these 
assumptions, a psuedo-metric space. While it may be possible to 
circumvent this difficulty by considering semigroups of endomorph-
isms associated with formal languages rather than groups of 
automorphisms , further study is clearly required to analyze the 
situation. 
We now show that if every automorphism in a group G is 
uniforn1ly continuous as a map on P to P , then G is a topological 
group. We first prove that the map from G to G that takes each 
· ·automorphism into its inverse is continuous in the d':' topology. 
Lemma : For all g in G and for all E > 0 there is a o such that if 
d':' [ g, h J < o then d':' [ g- l, h- l J < E • 
Proof: Fir st we note that if for all x, d [ xg, xh J < E , then 
d':' [ g, h J ~ E • So if we c an show that for all E there exists a o such 
[ J [ -1 -1 that Vx(d xg, xh < o) - Vx(d xg , xh ]< E) we can complete the 
proof since d':' [ g, h J < o implies Vx( d[ xg, xh J < o) which in turn 
. l" d' [ - l h-l J Th f h 0 . k s: h h t 1mp 1es "' g , :5: E • en, or eac E > , pie u sue t a -
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d':< [ g, h] < o implies d':' [ g- 1, h-l J ~ E /2 < E • 
The uniform continuity of g-l implies that for all E there exists 
a o such that Vx(d[xg, xh] < o) - Vx(d[xg-l, xh-l] < E) • For if 
not, 
that 
then there exists an E such that for all o we can find an h such 
0 
Vx(d[xg, xh] < o) & 3:x(d[xg-l, xh-l] ~ E ) • The uniform 
0 
continuity of g-l guarantees that for E there exists o such that for 
0 0 
all xg and all xh , d[xg, xh] < o - d[x, xhg-l] < E • Combining 
0 0 
this with the supposition above we have for E and o an h such that 
. 0 0 0 
Vx(d[xg, xh J < o ) which implies Vx(d[ x, xhg-l J < E ) , via 
0 0 0 
continuity. The latter statement can be rewritten, by setting y = xh , 
[ -1 1 as Vy(d yh , yg- J < E ) , which is a contradiction, and completes 
0 
the proof. 
The following lemma shows that the map from G x G to G which 
takes (g 1, g 2 ) to g 1g 2 is continuous. Take n together, the two 
lemmas imply that G is a topological group. 
Lemma: Given g 1 and g 2 in G , for all E there exists o 1 and o 2 such 
that if d':'[g 1 , h 1 ] < o 1 and d':' [g2 , h 2 ] <oz then d':' [g1gz, h 1h 2 ]<E. 
Proof: Sinc e d':' [g1g 2 , h 1hz] ~ d':' [g1gz, h 1g 2 J + d':' [h1gz, h 1h 2 ], 
if we can find o1 and oz such that each of d ':' [ g 1 g 2 , h 1 g 2 J and 
d':' [ h 1 g 2 , h 1 hz] is less than or equal to E /3 , then 
d':' [ g 1 g 2 , h 1 h 2 J < E Sin ce sup d[ xh 1 g z, xh 1 hz J = 
sup d[ygz, yh2 ] = d':' [g2 , h 2 ], let o 2 = E/3. By the uniform 
continuity of g2 we have that for all E there exists o such that for all 
x, d[xg 1, xh 1 J < o - d[xg 1g 2 , xh1g 2 J < E /3 • Given E , we 
·pick o 1 such that d':' [ g 1 , h 1 ] < o 1 and thus by the s entence above 
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Vx(d [ xgl g2, xh 1g 2 ] < E/3), implying d':' [g1g 2 , h 1g 2 ] ~ E/3 • 
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APPENDIX 
The appendix is in two sections. In the first, we prove in the 
affirmative the decision problem for the elementary theory of 
Boolean algebras which are direct products of atomic and atomles s 
Boolean algebras. The main interest in this result is the decision 
method, which shows that every formula in the elementary theory is 
equivalent to a quantifier-free formula. In the second section, the 
results obtained from the decision method are used to prove the 
existence of the union of all elements of a direct product Boolean 
algebra which satisfy a given elementary formula . This result 
shows that every direct product Boolean a lgebra possess e s a very 
restricted completeness property, nam ely that the union of a class of 
elements exists when the class is definable by elementary formulas. 
Tarski [ 30] has proved in the affirmative the decision problem 
for general Boolean algebras, but the results, as they appear in the 
literature, do not enable one to prove that ~ a exists. Since this 
F(a) 
union must exist in order that a Boolean algebra b e a model of p a rt 
theory, we require the d e cision method presented below, 
The D ec ision Method 
This section follows the following outline , We define a standa rd 
form for forrn.ulas and proceed to show that Boolean connections of 
the se formulas c an be r educed to standard form, Next we show that 
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a standard form formula involving a quantifier is equivalent to a 
standard form formula without the quantifier. Using these results, 
we argue that any formula of the lower predicate calculus whose only 
predicate is 11 ~ 11 is equivalent to a formula in standard form. 
Finally we prove that this decision method is only valid for Boolean 
algebras which are direct products of atomic and atomless Boolean 
algebras. Implicitly we are using the fact that every Boolean algebra 
is the subdirect product of atomic and atomles s Boolean algebras. 
Let Zn be the collection of all functions from n to (0, 1} • Let 
For r E Zn let r 1 = (i \ r(i) = 1} , 
r
0 
= (i \ r(i) = 0} Given x , 
0 ••• ' xn-1 let y r 
D efinition: FR (x
0
, ••• , xn- l) is in S-form iff 
where At(k, £, m; y) is a predicate satisfied by k, £, m, and y 
just in case 
y is atomic iff k = 1 
y is not atomic iff k = 0 , 
y has >- n atoms iff £ = 1 and n = m 
and y has exactly n atoms iff £ = 0 and n = m • 
We may write FR for FR (x
0
, •• • , xn- l) • We will c ons i der k and £ 
to be elements of the two element Boolean algebra, (0, 1}. 
Professor F. B. Thompson pointed out this standard form 
(S- form) for use in proving the decision problem. Essentially, the 
y are the atoms of the subalgebra finitely generated by 
r 
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x
0
, ••• , xn-l • As we will show here, the elementary formulas can 
only specify unions, intersections, complements, and the atomic 
structure of the y and hence of the x .• 
r 1 
n Lemma: If r , s E 2 and r -/: s , then y • y = 0 • 
r s 
Proof: For some i E n , x. occurs in y uncomplemented and occurs 
1 r 
in y complemented, or vice versa. Since y and y are inter sec-
s r s 
tions of the x., y • y = 0 • 
1 r s 
We define formulas to be used in the next theorem. 
GS (a, b, c; x , • • • , x 1 } = /\ ( y = O ) & /\ [ y -/: o & At (a, b, c; y ) ] • o n- 0 s S s s SE.:> SE 
••• , x 1>. n-
... ' xn-l)=V 
fEA 
r 
[ /\ (y = 0) 
- s SES 
where 
& /\
8
[ys-/: O &At(f1 (s},f2 (s},f3 (s);ys)]] 
SE 
&(f1 (s) = kr & f 2 (s) = 0) - (f3 (s) < mr) 
&(f1 (s) = kr &f2 (s} = 1) - (f3 (s} = mr + 1 & f,r = O)} • 
f~ is a disjunction of formulas, one of which will hold if 
1 At(k , r f, , r m. r' The class A i s the means of selecting the r 
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the atomic conditions, one of which must hold if At(k , .l , m · y } 
r r r' r 
does not, 
We may drop (x , ••• , x 1 } when writing G, H, and I for o n-
compactness of expression. 
Theorem: (Not) Let FR(x , ••• , x 1 ) be a formula i n S-form. o n-
NR (x 0, ... , xn_ 1 )= V [ V HS]v V [ V HS v V 
Then 1 FR (x0 , ... ' 
rER rES czn rER rf:p~On 
x 1 } - NR(x , n- o • • • • x 1) • n-
Proof: 1 FR(x , ... , x 1} -o n-
v (y I= 0) v 
- r 
rER 
v [ y = 0 V 1 At (k , .l , 
rER r r r 
m. 
r' 
Let 
(i) yr f: 0 iff since V HS implies yr I= 0 
rbp~On 
by the construction of HS and yr I= 0 gives no condition on the 
rema ining members of R , or on the ir atomic structure. HS has 
been defined so that any con dition on the remaining members of 
R is satisfied by one of the HS in 
(ii) yr= 0 iff This case is like (i). All 
possible conditions on the remaining members of R are covered 
by the disjunction. 
(iii) [ y f. 0 & I At(k ' 
r r .l ' r 
m. 
r' y )] -r 
If y is not zero and does not have the atomic structure 
r 
(k , .l , m ) , then it has some other ato1nic structur e and every 
r r r 
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possibility is in the disjunction of the f~ . If some disjunction in 
one of the I8r is true, then y I= 0 and y does not have the atomic r r 
structure (k , t , m ) • 
r r r 
Theorem: (Or) If D 1 and D 2 are disjunctions of S-form formulas, 
then D 1 V D 2 is a disjunction of S-form formulas, 
To prove a similar result for conjunctions, we first require a 
lemma which enables us to increase the number of variables on 
which a formula depends. With this result, we can then as surne that 
the two formulas in a conjunction are both over the same variables. 
We define certain classes in order to state the lemma. We first 
require the notation that if s E 2m and m > n , then r = s I n means 
that r is the restriction of the function s to the first n integers. 
Definitions: n For R c 2 and n < m , 
R,:, = [S 5: 2m I VrER 3:sES(r = s \n) & VrER Vs[ r = s I n - sES]} • 
·'-The class R.,. will be used to expand the number of variables from n 
tom • Roughly, R':' will allow us to expan d in every possible 
manner. 
The follow ing d efinitions lead to a class · of triples of functions, 
each triple d ete rmining an atomic structure for an "expanded" yr • 
Er = [ s E 2m I r = s I n} 
K 
-r 
E 
= [Kr E 2 r J ff 
SEE 
r 
K (s) = k } 
r r 
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E 
L = {L E 2 rl ~ L (s) = f, } • 
-r r 
sEE r r 
r 
E 
and M = {M E Ul rl ~ M (s) = m } 
-r r SEE r r 
r 
& f3 ( s) = M I ( s) E M I & s E s } . s n -s n 
Lemma: (Adding Variables) Let FR (x
0
, ••• , xn-l) be a formula in 
S-form. . .. ' x 1) = m-
s~_ V [ /\ (y = 0) 
s SES SER ... <f1,f2 ,f3 > EQS 
& /\ [ y s I 0 & At(f 1 (s), f 2 (s), f 3 (s); y s)] J • SES 
If n < m then FR(x , ••• , x 1 ) - AR(x , •.• , x 1 ) • . o n- o m-
Proof: Assume FR(x , ••• , x 1 ) • Let x , ••• , x 1 take on any o n- n m-
particular values. Then at least one of the conjunctions in AR holds 
since . 
(i) 0 - y = 0 Yr = ~ for r = s In 
and (ii) if y I 0 & At(k , f, , m ; y ) th en each piece of y 
r r r r r . r 
determined by an s such that r = s \ n must p artake of the give 
atomic structure of y • In p a rticular, if y is atomic, i. e. , 
r r 
k = 1 , then each y f 0 such that r = s In must be atomic. The 
. r s 
cons truction of QS gua r a nte es thi s by forcing f 1 (s) = 1 for s E S 
such that r = s \ n • 
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If y is not atomic, 
r 
i. e. , k = 0 , then there 
r 
is some s such that r = s \ n and y I 0 and y is not atomic, again 
s s 
by the construction of 0 8 • A similar argument holds for the t 
and m parameters dete rmining the number of atoms in any piece. 
Now assume AR(x , ••• , x 1 ) , hence at least one of the o m-
conjunctions in AR holds. We will show that the restriction of this 
conjunction to n variables is satisfied. 
(i) If y = 0 for all s such that r = s In then clearly y = 0 • 
s · r 
(ii) If (i) is not the cas e for a given r then there is an s such 
that r = s \ n and y s I 0 • Hence y I 0 since y is the inte rsec-r r 
tion of the first n variables (complemente d or not) whose 
intersection with the remaining m - n variables is y • If y I 0 , 
s r 
consider the terms 
for which r = s \ n in the satisfied conjunction of AR • Since 
Y = ~ y , we have r s 
r =s\n 
A [ y I 0 & At(k ' 1, ' m . y )] -
r=s\n 
s s s s' s 
[y IO &At(Jlk, ~ 1, s' r s ~m· s' yr)] . 
s s s 
Now by the construction of these terms i n AR , we have 
T(k = k 
s r 
s 
Lemma 1: If FR (x , 
1 0 ... ' 
and~ m = m 
s r Therefore AR - FR • 
s 
xn- l) and F Rz (x 0 , • , • , xn- l) are 
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formulas in S-form, then FR (x , 
1 0 •• 0 ' 
x l) & FR (x , ••• , x l) 
n- 2 o n-
is satisfied only if R 1 = R 2 • 
Proof: Suppose R 1 t R 2 • Then there is an r in the symmetric 
difference of R 1 and R 2 , say in R 1 but not in R 2 • 
FR but y = 0 in FR , hence FR & FR is false. 
1 r 2 1 2 
Hence y t 0 in 
r 
i Notation: Let k 
r 
;} , mi be the atomic structure parameters in 
r r 
FR if i = 1 and in GR if i = 2 • 
Lemma 2: If FR and GR are S-form formulas then FR & GR only if 
1 2 VrER[k =k] 
r r 
1 & VrE"R [(.R, 
r 
& VrE"R [(..e1 
r 
= 0 & ..e2 = 
r 
& VrE"R[(..e1 =1 & i = O)-m1 ~ m 2 ] 
r r r r 
Proof: k 1 = k 2 for otherwise y is both atomic and not atomic. 
r r r 
Similar ly, if ..e1 = ..e2 = 0 then y has exactly m 1 = m 2 atoms. If 
r r ' r r r 
.t1 = 0 and ..e2 = 1 , then y has exactly m 1 and greater than or equal 
r r r r 
to m 2 atoms, hence m 1 ~ m 2 • Similarly if ..e1 = 1 and ..e2 = 0 • 
r r r r r 
To state the the orem for conjunctions we use the formula 
CR(x , •.• , x l) = f\ [ y = 0 J 
o n- rER r 
/\ 1 2 1 2 & /\ [y t 0 &At(k , .R, • £ ·,ma x(m ,m };y }] 
R r r r r r r r TE 
Theor em : (And} If FR (x , ... , x 1 ) and FR (x , •.• , x 1 ) are 1 o n- 2 o n-
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formulas in S-form, then FR (x , •.• , x 1 } & FR (x , •.• , x 1 } iff 1 o n- 2 o n-
CR (x , •.• , x 1} and lemmas 1 and 2 hold for FR and FR • 1 ° n- 1 2 
Proof: Assume FR & FR • Then R 1 = R 2 by lemma 1 and the 1 2 
atomic structur e s of F 1 and F 2 are interrelated as described in 
lemma 2. Let R = R 1 • It remains to show that CR(x , ••• , x 1 } o n-
is satisfied, Since R 1 = R 2 , if yr = 0 in F 1 and F 2 by the construe-
tion of CR the same term is pr esent in CR • Similarly if y f:. 0 in 
r 
F 1 and F 2 • The on ly remaining question is the atomic structure of 
yr f: 0 in CR • Since lemma 2 holds, the parameters 
1 2 1 2 (k , J, • J, , max(m , m )} do describe the atomic structure 
r r r r r 
of y • 
r 
k l = k2 1 2 1 2 1 For, - , and if J, = J, = 0 , then max(m , m } = m 
r r r r · r r r 
2 
= m 
r ' 
1 2 1 2 1 2 
while if J, = 0 and J, = 1 , max(m , m ) = m ;;>: m , 
r r r r r r 
Now assume that R 1 = R 2 = R and the conditions on the atomic 
structure parameters are as described in lemma 2, and that 
CR(x , ••• , x 1 ) is satisfied. o n- Then it is clear that FR is satisfied 1 
and so is FR hence FR & FR is satisfied. 
2 1 2 
We use the following classes and formula to state the elimination 
of quantifiers theorem. If S ~ 2n+l , then 
... _ 
3:) s(sES- r =sin)}, and R-··= [rERI r=stn-s(n)=l}, 
For rER, let k = rr k 
s ' 
J, = ~ J, and m = ~ m r SEE r sEE s ' r SEE s 
r r r 
Note that E contains at most two 
r 
elements for each r • 
Define WR (x, ••• , x 1 ) = (\ [y =0] & (\ [y f:.O &At(k , J, ,m ;y )]. o n- -R r R r r r r r 
rE rE 
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Theorem: (Elim ination of Quantifier s} If F 5 (x , ••• , x 1, x } is a o n- n 
formula in S-form then 3:xnF 5 (x0 , ••• , xn} - WR (x0 , ••• , xn-l} • 
Proof: Assume WR(x , ••• , x 1 ) • We will show that o n-
3:x F 5 (x , n o . ~K ' x ) • n As a notational convenience, we write x
0 for x 
1 
and x for x. 
i If rE R , for any x , x ·yr = 0 for i = 0 , 1 , since y = 0 • 
r 
By 
the definition of R , rE R implies any extension of r ton+ 1 variables 
is a member of S • Hence for each s such that s \ nER , [ y = OJ 
s 
is satisfied. 
+ Consider rE R • We must show that 
[ 1-i J [ i J_ i ) J y • x = 0 & y • x r 0 & At(k, t, m; Yr• xn 
r n . r n 
in F Sis satisfied for each rE R+, where i depends on r • Since 
+ 
rE R , we know that 
sinc e W is satisfied, and by construction, k = k , J, = J, , and 
r r r 
m =m 
r 
i = O· then 
r 
Let z = ~ y 
o .... r 
rER··-
Yr • z o = 1f _,_ (yr ; y t) 
tER··· 
::.::: 
+ i For each rE R , z ;;:: y 
o r 
Now rl. R since i = 0 
r 
and sinc e a ll the y' s are disjoint, 
thus y • z = yr 
r o 
Yr .· zo = ~ (y • Y } 
-·- r t tE R-.-
Now suppose i = 1 • Then 
r 
For if 
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,,, 
and since this time r is a member of R-·- and yr• y t = 0 if t f. r , we 
have y · • z = y • 
r o r 
S . i h 1-i 0 1n c e z ~ y , we ave y • z = • 
o r r o 
So if we set x = z , all 
n o 
of the terms in F S under consideration are satisfied. Combining the 
results for rE°R and rE R + , we see that /\ [ y = 0 J is satisfied. 
SES s 
The remaining terms of F S to be satisfied are of the form 
(y •x f. 0 &At(k1 , t 1 , m 1; y •x )] r n r n 
& (y ·x f. O &At(k2 , 1, m 2 ; y •x )] r n 2 r n 
for rE R - R + . In WR the corresponding terms are 
Here it is necessary to divide y into two pieces such that each has 
r 
the atomic structure specified in F S • To show that this is possible, 
we will consider cases. 
That is, bothy • x and y • x are atomic, 
r n r n 
If t 1 = t 2 = 0 , then yr has exactly m 1 + m 2 atoms, so there is a 
z ~ y with exactly m 2 atoms, hence r r 
At(k1 , t 1 , m 1; yr· zr) and At(k2 , t 2 , m 2 ; yr ·zr) • If t 1 = 1 
and t 2 = 0 , then yr has ~ m 1 + m 2 atoms, and again there is a 
zr ~ yr with exactly m 2 atoms such that At(k1 , t 1, m ·1 ; yr• 'Zr) 
and At(k2 , t 2 , m 2 ; yr· zr). Similarly if t 1 = t 2 = 1 or if 
.el = 0 ' 1z = 1 • 
(ii) k 1 = 0 and k 2 = 1 • Then y is not atomic. Now if r 
t 1 = t 2 = 0 , t hen yr h a s exactly m 1 + m 2 atoms , and if we let 
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zr be the union of exactly m 2 atoms of yr , we satisfy the 
appropriate terms in F S • If t 1 = 0 and ,e,2 = 1 , then yr has 
~ m 1 + m 2 atoms, and if we let zr be th e union of all but m 1 
atoms of yr , again we satisfy th e terms in F S • Similarly for 
the remaining combinations of t 1 and t 2 • 
(iii) k 1 = 1 and k 2 = 0 • This case is like (ii) except that we 
find some z ~ y • 
r r 
Then y · is not atom.ic and we must find a 
r 
z ~ y such that both y • z and y • z are not atomic with the 
r r r r r r 
appropriate numbers of atoms. Sinc e t he Boolean algebra is the 
direct product of an atomic and an atomles .s Boolean algebra, this 
is always possible, 
Let z = z + 
0 1; +Zr • 
rER-R 
Then z s ati sfies F 5 (x , ••• , x 1 , z) • o n-
For the proof i n the other direction, assume 3:x F 5 (x , ••• , x · 1 , x ) • n o n- n 
Then z as constructed above also satisfies F 5 (x , ••• , x 1 , z) , and o n-
so WR(x , •• • , x 1 ) is satisfied, o n-
It remains to show that every formula of the lower predicate 
calculus with ~ as the only predicate is equivalent to a disjunction of 
S-form formulas. This is done by induction on the length of a form-
ula . 
Terms : x
0 
~ x 1 is equivalent to a disjunction of cert~in 
F 5 (x0 , x 1 ) • This disjunction i ncludes the various possible atomic 
conditions on x~ • x{ in the form At (l, 1, l; x~ • x{) or 
At(O, 1, O; x~K x{) . The F s are of the form X O. xl = 0 rn con junction 
with XO. x l. XO. xl. XO. xl either equal to zero or not equal to zero in 
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all possible ways, and whenever x~ • x{ t 0 , one of the two atomic 
conditions. The disjunction of these twenty...:five S-form formulas is 
satisfied if and only if x ~ x 1 • . 0 
Negation: If D is a disjunction of formulas in S-form, say 
then -, D - 1 F 1 & ••• & 1 F p - N 1 & ••• & Np , where Ni is related 
to F. by the "not" theorem. By redistributing among the N 1 , ••• , N , l . p 
we obtain a disjunction of conjunctions of formulas in S-form, provid-
ed that all the F. are over the same variables. The adding variables 
l 
lemma guarantees that we c an find the appropriate formulas 
equivalent to the F .• 
l 
Conjunction: If C is a conjunction of formulas in S-form, by the 
adding variables lemma, C is equivalent to a conjunction of S-form 
formulas all over the same variables. By then applying the "and 11 
theorem sufficiently often we obtain an equivalent S-form formula or 
a contradiction. 
Quantifiers: If D is a disjunction of S-form formulas , 
D ::: F 1 V ••• V F p , then 3:xD - 3:xF 1 V ••• V 3:xF p and 
VxD - 1 3:x 1 D • Since 1 D is equivalent to a disjunction of 
S-form formulas, say F 1
1 V • •• V F q' , then 
VxD - 1 (3:xF 1
1 V ••• V 3:xF q') • By elimination of quantifie rs, 
disjunctions of S -form formulas equivalent to 3:xD and VxD are 
obtained. 
This completes the decision method for the elementary theory of 
direct product Boolean a l gebras . Next we show that the elimination 
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of quantifiers theorem requires that the Boolean algebra be a direct 
product of an atomic and an atomless Boolean algebra. Assuming 
that the Boolean algebra is a subdirect product of an atomic and an 
atomless Boolean algebra possessing just the properties necessary 
for the proof of the elimination of quantifiers theorem, we prove that 
the Boolean algebra must be the direct product of its factors. 
Let B be a subdirect product of A x N where A is an atomic 
Boolean algebra and N is an atomless Boolean algebra. If b EB , we 
write b = <a, n> where a and n are the projections of b onto A and 
N, respectively. Let B possess the following property: 
{i} If <a, n> EB and a is the union of m atoms then for all 
m 1 ~ m there is an a 1 ~ a such that a 1 is the union of m 1 atoms 
and<a', O>EB. 
B must possess this property for the proof of the elimination of 
quantifiers theorem to be valid. 
Lemma: For all a EA , <a, 0> is in B • 
Proof: For some n EN , <a, n> is in B • Then by (i} , <a, 0> EB • 
Lemma: If< a, n> EB then< 0, n> EB. 
Proof: Using the previous lemma, <a, 0> EB • Hence 
<a, n> - <a, 0> = < 0, n> is in B • 
Theorem: B is the direct product A x N • 
Proof: First, for all n EN , < 0, n> is in B since for all n EN there 
is some a EA such that <a, n> EB and applying the lemma above 
gives the result. Now let a be any member of A , n any member of 
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N • Then < a, 0> + < 0, n> = <a, n> EB • 
Existence of Unions 
Let F(x , ••• , x l' a) be a formula of the lower predicate 
o n-
calculus over the predicate 11 s; 11 • We will show that 
F(x , 
0 
~a 
... ' x 1 , a) n-
exists in any Boolean algebra which is the direct product of an atomic 
and an atomless Boolean algebra. By the decision method in the first 
section, it suffices to show that the union exists for formulas which 
are disjunctions of S-form form ulas. Suppose F 1 , ••• , F n are 
S-form formulas such that the union exists for each formula, Then 
the union exists for the formula F 1 V ••• V F n by the following 
argument. For each i , let T. = [a I F. (a)} and let 
1 1 
Then T is the union of th e T. and 
1 
from Sikorski [ 2 8 , p. 59] we have 
where the existence of the left side implies the existence of the right. 
It remains to show that the union exists for any S-forrn. formula . 
Let FS(x , .•• , x 1 , a) be an S-form formula. The first n variables o n-
can be considered to be parameters since we are taking the union of 
all a satisfying FS(x , ••• , x 1 , a) • So consider x , ••• , x 1 to o n- o n-
be fixed elements of the Boolean algebra such that F S is true for at 
l east one a • Unde r th ese conditions we will find an equivalent 
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formula from which the union can be determined directly. We use an 
intermediate formula which is F S rewritten to display the variable a • 
For s ES and r = s \ n , let y = 7T x. • T( x. . Then 
r. l1. 0 1 lEr lEr 
F S(x
0
, ••• , xn-l' a) is equivalent to BS(y 
0
, ••• , yp; a) where 
= /\ 
SES 
[ s(n) yl •a =0] s n 
For each r E 2n exactly one of the following four cases is a conjunc-
tion in BS and the cases, repeated enough times, exhaust BS • If 
yr satisfies case j , we may index yr as yjk • 
1. {y • a = 0) & (y • a = 0) ;, In this c ase y = 0 and terms of r r r 
this type imply no restriction on a • So BS is equivalent to a formula 
with terms satisfying this case removed. 
2. {y •a= 0) & (y •a I 0 &At{k, £, m; yr·a)) • In this 
r r 
case we have (a :::0: yr) and BS is equivalent to a formula with terms 
of this type replaced by {a :::o: y 2k) for an appropriate indexing set, 
k E [l, ..• , q} • 
3. {y ·a= 0) & (y ·a IO &At(k, £, m; yr•a)) • Here we 
r r 
have (a ~ yr) and BS is equivalent to a formula with terms of this 
type replaced by Ea ~ y 3k) fork E [l, ••• , t} . 
In cas e these three c ases exhaust BS , we have the equival ent 
formula 
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Since yr ~ y s for all s -f r and yr f- y s for all r and s , we have that 
the least upper bound of all a satisfying the above conjunction is the 
intersection of the y 3k , :Ea = y 31 ••• y 3 t • If there are no terms of 
type 3 in BS , :Ea = 1 • 
If BS has terms of type 4 below, we use the fact that the Boolean 
algebra is a direct product to determine :Ea. Let a be the projec-
tion onto the atomic factor, 13 the projection onto the atomless factor, 
and let b be the least upper bound of the a satisfying the above 
conjunction, that is, the least upper bound of the a satisfying all 
terms in BS of the first three types. If terms of type 3 exist, 
b = )7 31 ••• y 3t, otherwise b = 1 • Let the y satisfying terms of r 
type 4 below be indexed y 41 , ••• , y 4 u • We will determine :Ea by 
determining :E a(a) and :E 13 (a) • 
4. {yr •a f 0 & At{k', V, m'; Y • a)) 
r 
& {y •a -f 0 & At{k, i, m; y •a)) 
r r 
Since BS holds, so does At(k' + k, f,' + £, m' + m; yr). a(yr ·a) is 
the union of m atoms of y if i, = 0 , the union of at least m atoms 
r 
if £=1. C _onsider the y 43. such that At(k, 0, O; y 4 . •a) • . J Let them 
beindexedasy1, ••• , Yv· For e ach y. , a(y. ·a) = 0 so l 1 
a{a) ~ a{)Ti) • If v -f 0, let c = y 1 ••• yv, otherwise c = 1 • Then for 
every a satisfying all t e r ms of type 4 in BS it is the case that 
a{a) ~ a{c). Now l e t the y 4 j which are not in (y 1, ••• , yv} be 
indexe d as y 1, .•• , yw. For each of these, a{yj •a) conta ins at leas t 
one atom. Thus, the least upper bound for a {a) such tha t a satisfies 
all terms of type 4 i n BS contains every atom in each of y 1 , ••• , y w 
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and thus all of d = [ a(y 1 ) + ••• + a(y ) J • By our previous results, '\V 
a(b) • a(c) is an upper bound to a(a) • Since all the y are disjoint, 
d ~ a(b) • a(c) • We will show that a(b) • a(c) is the least upper bound. 
Suppose there is some z < a(b) • a(c) which is an upper bound to all 
a(a) such tha t a satisfies BS • Consider z' = a(b) •a( c) - z • z' 
meets some y -/:. 0 , or else is in the complement of the union of all 
r 
they • If z' meets somey -/:. 0 then since z' < a(b)·a(c), they 
r r r 
must either satisfy case 2 or else be in [y 1 , ••• , y w } . . In either 
case there is an a such that a· z' -/:. 0 , contradiction, Hence z' 
must be in the complement of the union of all the y • In this case, 
r 
Y • z' = 0 and y • z' - y for all r • r r - r Therefore if a satisfies BS 
then a + z' satisfies BS , hence z is not an upper bound, We have 
proved that 
:Ea (a) = a (b) • a ( c) • 
To determine :Ef3(a) we consider four subcases, 
( i) k = 1 and k' = 1 • In this case y is atomic and 
r 
13(y ·a) = 13(0) for any a • 
r 
This subcase does not restrict f3(a) 
in any way and we need not conside r it further . 
(ii) k = 1 and k' = 0 • That is, ,., y •a is atomic and y • a 
r r 
is not atomic. We h ave the condition f3(y •a) = f3(0) , or 
r 
13(a) ~ 13(y r) • Let the y 4 j in BS which sati sfy subcase (ii) be 
indexedy 1, •• • , yx and let e = y1 
(iii) k = 0 and k' = 1 . That is, y • a is not atomic and 
r 
yr· a is atomic. We have the condition 13(y r. a) = 13(0) , or 
Let f be the union of the y satisfying this 
r 
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subcase. Any upper bound of 13(a) must include 13(f). 
{iv) k = 0 and k' = 0 • In this case y •a is not atomic and 
r 
y • a is not atomic. Since any a such that y ·a and y • a are 
r r r 
not atomic satisfies this subcase, any upper bound of 13 (a) 
includes all of 13(y ) • Since 13(y ) ~ 13(y ) for all s f:. r , and 
r r s 
13{f) ~ 13(b) • 13(e) , we have 
I; 13 (a) = 13 (b) • 13 ( e) 
by essentially the same proof as for the atomic factor. 
Combining the atomic and atomless least upper bounds, we 
have 
I; a = < Cl' (b) • Cl' ( c) , 13 (b) • 13 ( e) > 
as the least upper bound for the a satisfying BS • 
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